X-Git-Url: https://git.ozlabs.org/?p=ppp.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=pppd%2Fchap_ms.c;h=e3d808fd86ccb094cead86629234c3da6c54cdee;hp=0fe1888c150e9195c4a88c07c9ea11068f17a42a;hb=HEAD;hpb=e50870a901749c7390109404e90c095ea3ef7072 diff --git a/pppd/chap_ms.c b/pppd/chap_ms.c index 0fe1888..e3d808f 100644 --- a/pppd/chap_ms.c +++ b/pppd/chap_ms.c @@ -45,12 +45,40 @@ * Implemented MS-CHAPv2 functionality, heavily based on sample * implementation in RFC 2759. Implemented MPPE functionality, * heavily based on sample implementation in RFC 3079. - * Copyright (c) 2002 Google, Inc. + * + * Copyright (c) 2002 Google, Inc. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in + * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the + * distribution. + * + * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to + * endorse or promote products derived from this software without + * prior written permission. + * + * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO + * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY + * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN + * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING + * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + * */ -#define RCSID "$Id: chap_ms.c,v 1.26 2002/12/23 23:24:37 fcusack Exp $" +#define RCSID "$Id: chap_ms.c,v 1.38 2007/12/01 20:10:51 carlsonj Exp $" -#ifdef CHAPMS +#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H +#include "config.h" +#endif #include #include @@ -59,98 +87,489 @@ #include #include #include +#if defined(SOL2) +#include +#else +#include +#endif -#include "pppd.h" +#include "pppd-private.h" +#include "options.h" #include "chap.h" #include "chap_ms.h" -#include "md4.h" -#include "sha1.h" -#include "pppcrypt.h" - -static const char rcsid[] = RCSID; - - -static void ChallengeHash __P((u_char[16], u_char *, char *, u_char[8])); -static void ascii2unicode __P((char[], int, u_char[])); -static void NTPasswordHash __P((char *, int, u_char[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE])); -static void ChallengeResponse __P((u_char *, u_char *, u_char[24])); -static void ChapMS_NT __P((u_char *, char *, int, u_char[24])); -static void ChapMS2_NT __P((char *, u_char[16], char *, char *, int, - u_char[24])); -static void GenerateAuthenticatorResponse __P((char*, int, u_char[24], - u_char[16], u_char *, - char *, u_char[41])); -#ifdef MSLANMAN -static void ChapMS_LANMan __P((u_char *, char *, int, MS_ChapResponse *)); -#endif +#include "magic.h" +#include "mppe.h" +#include "crypto.h" +#include "crypto_ms.h" -#ifdef MPPE -static void Set_Start_Key __P((u_char *, char *, int)); -static void SetMasterKeys __P((char *, int, u_char[24], int)); +#ifdef UNIT_TEST +#undef PPP_WITH_MPPE #endif -extern double drand48 __P((void)); +static void ascii2unicode (char[], int, u_char[]); +static void NTPasswordHash (u_char *, int, unsigned char *); +static int ChallengeResponse (u_char *, u_char *, u_char*); +static void ChapMS_NT (u_char *, char *, int, u_char[24]); +static void ChapMS2_NT (u_char *, u_char[16], char *, char *, int, + u_char[24]); +static void GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain + (char*, int, u_char[24], u_char[16], u_char *, + char *, u_char[41]); +#ifdef PPP_WITH_MSLANMAN +static void ChapMS_LANMan (u_char *, char *, int, u_char *); +#endif -#ifdef MSLANMAN +#ifdef PPP_WITH_MSLANMAN bool ms_lanman = 0; /* Use LanMan password instead of NT */ /* Has meaning only with MS-CHAP challenges */ #endif -#ifdef MPPE -u_char mppe_send_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN]; -u_char mppe_recv_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN]; -int mppe_keys_set = 0; /* Have the MPPE keys been set? */ +#ifdef PPP_WITH_MPPE +#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY +/* For MPPE debug */ +/* Use "[]|}{?/><,`!2&&(" (sans quotes) for RFC 3079 MS-CHAPv2 test value */ +static char *mschap_challenge = NULL; +/* Use "!@\#$%^&*()_+:3|~" (sans quotes, backslash is to escape #) for ... */ +static char *mschap2_peer_challenge = NULL; #endif +#include "fsm.h" /* Need to poke MPPE options */ +#include "ccp.h" +#endif + +/* + * Command-line options. + */ +static struct option chapms_option_list[] = { +#ifdef PPP_WITH_MSLANMAN + { "ms-lanman", o_bool, &ms_lanman, + "Use LanMan passwd when using MS-CHAP", 1 }, +#endif +#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY + { "mschap-challenge", o_string, &mschap_challenge, + "specify CHAP challenge" }, + { "mschap2-peer-challenge", o_string, &mschap2_peer_challenge, + "specify CHAP peer challenge" }, +#endif + { NULL } +}; + +/* + * chapms_generate_challenge - generate a challenge for MS-CHAP. + * For MS-CHAP the challenge length is fixed at 8 bytes. + * The length goes in challenge[0] and the actual challenge starts + * at challenge[1]. + */ static void +chapms_generate_challenge(unsigned char *challenge) +{ + *challenge++ = 8; +#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY + if (mschap_challenge && strlen(mschap_challenge) == 8) + memcpy(challenge, mschap_challenge, 8); + else +#endif + random_bytes(challenge, 8); +} + +static void +chapms2_generate_challenge(unsigned char *challenge) +{ + *challenge++ = 16; +#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY + if (mschap_challenge && strlen(mschap_challenge) == 16) + memcpy(challenge, mschap_challenge, 16); + else +#endif + random_bytes(challenge, 16); +} + +static int +chapms_verify_response(int id, char *name, + unsigned char *secret, int secret_len, + unsigned char *challenge, unsigned char *response, + char *message, int message_space) +{ + unsigned char md[MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN]; + int diff; + int challenge_len, response_len; + + challenge_len = *challenge++; /* skip length, is 8 */ + response_len = *response++; + if (response_len != MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN) + goto bad; + +#ifndef PPP_WITH_MSLANMAN + if (!response[MS_CHAP_USENT]) { + /* Should really propagate this into the error packet. */ + notice("Peer request for LANMAN auth not supported"); + goto bad; + } +#endif + + /* Generate the expected response. */ + ChapMS(challenge, (char *)secret, secret_len, md); + +#ifdef PPP_WITH_MSLANMAN + /* Determine which part of response to verify against */ + if (!response[MS_CHAP_USENT]) + diff = memcmp(&response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP], + &md[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP], MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP_LEN); + else +#endif + diff = memcmp(&response[MS_CHAP_NTRESP], &md[MS_CHAP_NTRESP], + MS_CHAP_NTRESP_LEN); + + if (diff == 0) { + slprintf(message, message_space, "Access granted"); + return 1; + } + + bad: + /* See comments below for MS-CHAP V2 */ + slprintf(message, message_space, "E=691 R=1 C=%0.*B V=0", + challenge_len, challenge); + return 0; +} + +static int +chapms2_verify_response(int id, char *name, + unsigned char *secret, int secret_len, + unsigned char *challenge, unsigned char *response, + char *message, int message_space) +{ + unsigned char md[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN]; + char saresponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]; + int challenge_len, response_len; + + challenge_len = *challenge++; /* skip length, is 16 */ + response_len = *response++; + if (response_len != MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN) + goto bad; /* not even the right length */ + + /* Generate the expected response and our mutual auth. */ + ChapMS2(challenge, &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], name, + (char *)secret, secret_len, md, + (unsigned char *)saresponse, MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATOR); + + /* compare MDs and send the appropriate status */ + /* + * Per RFC 2759, success message must be formatted as + * "S= M=" + * where + * is the Authenticator Response (mutual auth) + * is a text message + * + * However, some versions of Windows (win98 tested) do not know + * about the M= part (required per RFC 2759) and flag + * it as an error (reported incorrectly as an encryption error + * to the user). Since the RFC requires it, and it can be + * useful information, we supply it if the peer is a conforming + * system. Luckily (?), win98 sets the Flags field to 0x04 + * (contrary to RFC requirements) so we can use that to + * distinguish between conforming and non-conforming systems. + * + * Special thanks to Alex Swiridov for + * help debugging this. + */ + if (memcmp(&md[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], + MS_CHAP2_NTRESP_LEN) == 0) { + if (response[MS_CHAP2_FLAGS]) + slprintf(message, message_space, "S=%s", saresponse); + else + slprintf(message, message_space, "S=%s M=%s", + saresponse, "Access granted"); + return 1; + } + + bad: + /* + * Failure message must be formatted as + * "E=e R=r C=c V=v M=m" + * where + * e = error code (we use 691, ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE) + * r = retry (we use 1, ok to retry) + * c = challenge to use for next response, we reuse previous + * v = Change Password version supported, we use 0 + * m = text message + * + * The M=m part is only for MS-CHAPv2. Neither win2k nor + * win98 (others untested) display the message to the user anyway. + * They also both ignore the E=e code. + * + * Note that it's safe to reuse the same challenge as we don't + * actually accept another response based on the error message + * (and no clients try to resend a response anyway). + * + * Basically, this whole bit is useless code, even the small + * implementation here is only because of overspecification. + */ + slprintf(message, message_space, "E=691 R=1 C=%0.*B V=0 M=%s", + challenge_len, challenge, "Access denied"); + return 0; +} + +static void +chapms_make_response(unsigned char *response, int id, char *our_name, + unsigned char *challenge, char *secret, int secret_len, + unsigned char *private) +{ + challenge++; /* skip length, should be 8 */ + *response++ = MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN; + ChapMS(challenge, secret, secret_len, response); +} + +struct chapms2_response_cache_entry { + int id; + unsigned char challenge[16]; + unsigned char response[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN]; + unsigned char auth_response[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH]; +}; + +#define CHAPMS2_MAX_RESPONSE_CACHE_SIZE 10 +static struct chapms2_response_cache_entry + chapms2_response_cache[CHAPMS2_MAX_RESPONSE_CACHE_SIZE]; +static int chapms2_response_cache_next_index = 0; +static int chapms2_response_cache_size = 0; + +static void +chapms2_add_to_response_cache(int id, unsigned char *challenge, + unsigned char *response, + unsigned char *auth_response) +{ + int i = chapms2_response_cache_next_index; + + chapms2_response_cache[i].id = id; + memcpy(chapms2_response_cache[i].challenge, challenge, 16); + memcpy(chapms2_response_cache[i].response, response, + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN); + memcpy(chapms2_response_cache[i].auth_response, + auth_response, MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH); + chapms2_response_cache_next_index = + (i + 1) % CHAPMS2_MAX_RESPONSE_CACHE_SIZE; + if (chapms2_response_cache_next_index > chapms2_response_cache_size) + chapms2_response_cache_size = chapms2_response_cache_next_index; + dbglog("added response cache entry %d", i); +} + +static struct chapms2_response_cache_entry* +chapms2_find_in_response_cache(int id, unsigned char *challenge, + unsigned char *auth_response) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < chapms2_response_cache_size; i++) { + if (id == chapms2_response_cache[i].id + && (!challenge + || memcmp(challenge, + chapms2_response_cache[i].challenge, + 16) == 0) + && (!auth_response + || memcmp(auth_response, + chapms2_response_cache[i].auth_response, + MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH) == 0)) { + dbglog("response found in cache (entry %d)", i); + return &chapms2_response_cache[i]; + } + } + return NULL; /* not found */ +} + +static void +chapms2_make_response(unsigned char *response, int id, char *our_name, + unsigned char *challenge, char *secret, int secret_len, + unsigned char *private) +{ + const struct chapms2_response_cache_entry *cache_entry; + unsigned char auth_response[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]; + + challenge++; /* skip length, should be 16 */ + *response++ = MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN; + cache_entry = chapms2_find_in_response_cache(id, challenge, NULL); + if (cache_entry) { + memcpy(response, cache_entry->response, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN); + return; + } + ChapMS2(challenge, +#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY + mschap2_peer_challenge, +#else + NULL, +#endif + our_name, secret, secret_len, response, auth_response, + MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATEE); + chapms2_add_to_response_cache(id, challenge, response, auth_response); +} + +static int +chapms2_check_success(int id, unsigned char *msg, int len) +{ + if ((len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 2) || + strncmp((char *)msg, "S=", 2) != 0) { + /* Packet does not start with "S=" */ + error("MS-CHAPv2 Success packet is badly formed."); + return 0; + } + msg += 2; + len -= 2; + if (len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + || !chapms2_find_in_response_cache(id, NULL /* challenge */, msg)) { + /* Authenticator Response did not match expected. */ + error("MS-CHAPv2 mutual authentication failed."); + return 0; + } + /* Authenticator Response matches. */ + msg += MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; /* Eat it */ + len -= MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; + if ((len >= 3) && !strncmp((char *)msg, " M=", 3)) { + msg += 3; /* Eat the delimiter */ + } else if ((len >= 2) && !strncmp((char *)msg, "M=", 2)) { + msg += 2; /* Eat the delimiter */ + } else if (len) { + /* Packet has extra text which does not begin " M=" */ + error("MS-CHAPv2 Success packet is badly formed."); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +static void +chapms_handle_failure(unsigned char *inp, int len) +{ + int err; + char *p, *msg; + + /* We want a null-terminated string for strxxx(). */ + msg = malloc(len + 1); + if (!msg) { + notice("Out of memory in chapms_handle_failure"); + return; + } + BCOPY(inp, msg, len); + msg[len] = 0; + p = msg; + + /* + * Deal with MS-CHAP formatted failure messages; just print the + * M= part (if any). For MS-CHAP we're not really supposed + * to use M=, but it shouldn't hurt. See + * chapms[2]_verify_response. + */ + if (!strncmp(p, "E=", 2)) + err = strtol(p+2, NULL, 10); /* Remember the error code. */ + else + goto print_msg; /* Message is badly formatted. */ + + if (len && ((p = strstr(p, " M=")) != NULL)) { + /* M= field found. */ + p += 3; + } else { + /* No M=; use the error code. */ + switch (err) { + case MS_CHAP_ERROR_RESTRICTED_LOGON_HOURS: + p = "E=646 Restricted logon hours"; + break; + + case MS_CHAP_ERROR_ACCT_DISABLED: + p = "E=647 Account disabled"; + break; + + case MS_CHAP_ERROR_PASSWD_EXPIRED: + p = "E=648 Password expired"; + break; + + case MS_CHAP_ERROR_NO_DIALIN_PERMISSION: + p = "E=649 No dialin permission"; + break; + + case MS_CHAP_ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAILURE: + p = "E=691 Authentication failure"; + break; + + case MS_CHAP_ERROR_CHANGING_PASSWORD: + /* Should never see this, we don't support Change Password. */ + p = "E=709 Error changing password"; + break; + + default: + free(msg); + error("Unknown MS-CHAP authentication failure: %.*v", + len, inp); + return; + } + } +print_msg: + if (p != NULL) + error("MS-CHAP authentication failed: %v", p); + free(msg); +} + +static int ChallengeResponse(u_char *challenge, - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE], - u_char response[24]) + u_char *PasswordHash, + u_char *response) { - u_char ZPasswordHash[21]; + u_char ZPasswordHash[24]; + PPP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; BZERO(ZPasswordHash, sizeof(ZPasswordHash)); - BCOPY(PasswordHash, ZPasswordHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); + BCOPY(PasswordHash, ZPasswordHash, MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH); #if 0 dbglog("ChallengeResponse - ZPasswordHash %.*B", sizeof(ZPasswordHash), ZPasswordHash); #endif - (void) DesSetkey(ZPasswordHash + 0); - DesEncrypt(challenge, response + 0); - (void) DesSetkey(ZPasswordHash + 7); - DesEncrypt(challenge, response + 8); - (void) DesSetkey(ZPasswordHash + 14); - DesEncrypt(challenge, response + 16); + if (DesEncrypt(challenge, ZPasswordHash + 0, response + 0) && + DesEncrypt(challenge, ZPasswordHash + 7, response + 8) && + DesEncrypt(challenge, ZPasswordHash + 14, response + 16)) + return 1; #if 0 dbglog("ChallengeResponse - response %.24B", response); #endif + return 0; } -static void +void ChallengeHash(u_char PeerChallenge[16], u_char *rchallenge, char *username, u_char Challenge[8]) { - SHA1_CTX sha1Context; - u_char sha1Hash[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - char *user; + PPP_MD_CTX* ctx; + u_char hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + int hash_len; + const char *user; /* remove domain from "domain\username" */ if ((user = strrchr(username, '\\')) != NULL) ++user; else user = username; + + ctx = PPP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (ctx != NULL) { + + if (PPP_DigestInit(ctx, PPP_sha1())) { - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PeerChallenge, 16); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, rchallenge, 16); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, user, strlen(user)); - SHA1_Final(sha1Hash, &sha1Context); + if (PPP_DigestUpdate(ctx, PeerChallenge, 16)) { - BCOPY(sha1Hash, Challenge, 8); + if (PPP_DigestUpdate(ctx, rchallenge, 16)) { + + if (PPP_DigestUpdate(ctx, user, strlen(user))) { + + hash_len = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; + if (PPP_DigestFinal(ctx, hash, &hash_len)) { + + BCOPY(hash, Challenge, 8); + } + } + } + } + } + + PPP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); + } } /* @@ -171,20 +590,22 @@ ascii2unicode(char ascii[], int ascii_len, u_char unicode[]) } static void -NTPasswordHash(char *secret, int secret_len, u_char hash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]) +NTPasswordHash(u_char *secret, int secret_len, unsigned char* hash) { -#ifdef __NetBSD__ - /* NetBSD uses the libc md4 routines which take bytes instead of bits */ - int mdlen = secret_len; -#else - int mdlen = secret_len * 8; -#endif - MD4_CTX md4Context; + PPP_MD_CTX* ctx = PPP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (ctx != NULL) { - MD4Init(&md4Context); - MD4Update(&md4Context, secret, mdlen); - MD4Final(hash, &md4Context); + if (PPP_DigestInit(ctx, PPP_md4())) { + if (PPP_DigestUpdate(ctx, secret, secret_len)) { + + int hash_len = MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH; + PPP_DigestFinal(ctx, hash, &hash_len); + } + } + + PPP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); + } } static void @@ -192,7 +613,7 @@ ChapMS_NT(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, u_char NTResponse[24]) { u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + u_char PasswordHash[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* Hash the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); @@ -202,11 +623,11 @@ ChapMS_NT(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, } static void -ChapMS2_NT(char *rchallenge, u_char PeerChallenge[16], char *username, +ChapMS2_NT(u_char *rchallenge, u_char PeerChallenge[16], char *username, char *secret, int secret_len, u_char NTResponse[24]) { u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + u_char PasswordHash[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; u_char Challenge[8]; ChallengeHash(PeerChallenge, rchallenge, username, Challenge); @@ -218,35 +639,36 @@ ChapMS2_NT(char *rchallenge, u_char PeerChallenge[16], char *username, ChallengeResponse(Challenge, PasswordHash, NTResponse); } -#ifdef MSLANMAN +#ifdef PPP_WITH_MSLANMAN static u_char *StdText = (u_char *)"KGS!@#$%"; /* key from rasapi32.dll */ static void ChapMS_LANMan(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, - MS_ChapResponse *response) + unsigned char *response) { int i; u_char UcasePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD]; /* max is actually 14 */ - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + u_char PasswordHash[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* LANMan password is case insensitive */ BZERO(UcasePassword, sizeof(UcasePassword)); for (i = 0; i < secret_len; i++) UcasePassword[i] = (u_char)toupper(secret[i]); - (void) DesSetkey(UcasePassword + 0); - DesEncrypt( StdText, PasswordHash + 0 ); - (void) DesSetkey(UcasePassword + 7); - DesEncrypt( StdText, PasswordHash + 8 ); - ChallengeResponse(rchallenge, PasswordHash, response->LANManResp); + + if (DesEncrypt(StdText, UcasePassword + 0, PasswordHash + 0) && + DesEncrypt(StdText, UcasePassword + 7, PasswordHash + 8)) { + + ChallengeResponse(rchallenge, PasswordHash, &response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP]); + } } #endif -static void -GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(char *secret, int secret_len, - u_char NTResponse[24], u_char PeerChallenge[16], - u_char *rchallenge, char *username, - u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]) +void +GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(unsigned char* PasswordHashHash, + unsigned char *NTResponse, unsigned char *PeerChallenge, + unsigned char *rchallenge, char *username, + unsigned char *authResponse) { /* * "Magic" constants used in response generation, from RFC 2759. @@ -264,60 +686,85 @@ GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(char *secret, int secret_len, 0x6E }; int i; - SHA1_CTX sha1Context; - u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + PPP_MD_CTX *ctx; + u_char Digest[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {}; + int hash_len; u_char Challenge[8]; - /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ - ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); - NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); - NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash); + ctx = PPP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (ctx != NULL) { - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, sizeof(PasswordHashHash)); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, NTResponse, 24); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Magic1, sizeof(Magic1)); - SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); + if (PPP_DigestInit(ctx, PPP_sha1())) { + if (PPP_DigestUpdate(ctx, PasswordHashHash, MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH)) { + + if (PPP_DigestUpdate(ctx, NTResponse, 24)) { + + if (PPP_DigestUpdate(ctx, Magic1, sizeof(Magic1))) { + + hash_len = sizeof(Digest); + PPP_DigestFinal(ctx, Digest, &hash_len); + } + } + } + } + PPP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); + } + ChallengeHash(PeerChallenge, rchallenge, username, Challenge); - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Digest, sizeof(Digest)); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Challenge, sizeof(Challenge)); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Magic2, sizeof(Magic2)); - SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); + ctx = PPP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (ctx != NULL) { + + if (PPP_DigestInit(ctx, PPP_sha1())) { + + if (PPP_DigestUpdate(ctx, Digest, sizeof(Digest))) { + + if (PPP_DigestUpdate(ctx, Challenge, sizeof(Challenge))) { + + if (PPP_DigestUpdate(ctx, Magic2, sizeof(Magic2))) { + + hash_len = sizeof(Digest); + PPP_DigestFinal(ctx, Digest, &hash_len); + } + } + } + } + + PPP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); + } /* Convert to ASCII hex string. */ - for (i = 0; i < MAX((MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH / 2), sizeof(Digest)); i++) - sprintf(&authResponse[i * 2], "%02X", Digest[i]); + for (i = 0; i < MAX((MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH / 2), sizeof(Digest)); i++) { + sprintf((char *)&authResponse[i * 2], "%02X", Digest[i]); + } } -#ifdef MPPE -/* - * Set mppe_xxxx_key from the NTPasswordHashHash. - * RFC 2548 (RADIUS support) requires us to export this function (ugh). - */ -void -mppe_set_keys(u_char *rchallenge, u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]) +static void +GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain + (char *secret, int secret_len, + u_char NTResponse[24], u_char PeerChallenge[16], + u_char *rchallenge, char *username, + u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]) { - SHA1_CTX sha1Context; - u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ - - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, rchallenge, 8); - SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); - - /* Same key in both directions. */ - BCOPY(Digest, mppe_send_key, sizeof(mppe_send_key)); - BCOPY(Digest, mppe_recv_key, sizeof(mppe_recv_key)); + u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; + u_char PasswordHash[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + + /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ + ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); + NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); + NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), + PasswordHashHash); + + GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(PasswordHashHash, NTResponse, PeerChallenge, + rchallenge, username, authResponse); } + +#ifdef PPP_WITH_MPPE + /* * Set mppe_xxxx_key from MS-CHAP credentials. (see RFC 3079) */ @@ -325,15 +772,15 @@ static void Set_Start_Key(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len) { u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + u_char PasswordHash[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash); - mppe_set_keys(rchallenge, PasswordHashHash); + mppe_set_chapv1(rchallenge, PasswordHashHash); } /* @@ -342,176 +789,208 @@ Set_Start_Key(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len) static void SetMasterKeys(char *secret, int secret_len, u_char NTResponse[24], int IsServer) { - SHA1_CTX sha1Context; u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char MasterKey[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ - u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ - - u_char SHApad1[40] = - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; - u_char SHApad2[40] = - { 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, - 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, - 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, - 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2 }; - - /* "This is the MPPE Master Key" */ - u_char Magic1[27] = - { 0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, - 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x4d, 0x50, 0x50, 0x45, 0x20, 0x4d, - 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79 }; - /* "On the client side, this is the send key; " - "on the server side, it is the receive key." */ - u_char Magic2[84] = - { 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, - 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, - 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, - 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, - 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, - 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20, - 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e }; - /* "On the client side, this is the receive key; " - "on the server side, it is the send key." */ - u_char Magic3[84] = - { 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, - 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, - 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20, - 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, - 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, - 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, - 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e }; - u_char *s; - + u_char PasswordHash[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; + u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash); - - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, sizeof(PasswordHashHash)); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, NTResponse, 24); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Magic1, sizeof(Magic1)); - SHA1_Final(MasterKey, &sha1Context); - - /* - * generate send key - */ - if (IsServer) - s = Magic3; - else - s = Magic2; - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, MasterKey, 16); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad1, sizeof(SHApad1)); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, s, 84); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad2, sizeof(SHApad2)); - SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); - - BCOPY(Digest, mppe_send_key, sizeof(mppe_send_key)); - - /* - * generate recv key - */ - if (IsServer) - s = Magic2; - else - s = Magic3; - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, MasterKey, 16); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad1, sizeof(SHApad1)); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, s, 84); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad2, sizeof(SHApad2)); - SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); - - BCOPY(Digest, mppe_recv_key, sizeof(mppe_recv_key)); + mppe_set_chapv2(PasswordHashHash, NTResponse, IsServer); } -#endif /* MPPE */ +#endif /* PPP_WITH_MPPE */ void -ChapMS(chap_state *cstate, u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, - MS_ChapResponse *response) +ChapMS(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, + unsigned char *response) { -#if 0 - CHAPDEBUG((LOG_INFO, "ChapMS: secret is '%.*s'", secret_len, secret)); -#endif - BZERO(response, sizeof(*response)); + BZERO(response, MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN); - ChapMS_NT(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, response->NTResp); + ChapMS_NT(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, &response[MS_CHAP_NTRESP]); -#ifdef MSLANMAN - ChapMS_LANMan(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, response); +#ifdef PPP_WITH_MSLANMAN + ChapMS_LANMan(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, + &response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP]); /* preferred method is set by option */ - response->UseNT[0] = !ms_lanman; + response[MS_CHAP_USENT] = !ms_lanman; #else - response->UseNT[0] = 1; + response[MS_CHAP_USENT] = 1; #endif - cstate->resp_length = MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN; - -#ifdef MPPE +#ifdef PPP_WITH_MPPE Set_Start_Key(rchallenge, secret, secret_len); - mppe_keys_set = 1; #endif } /* - * If PeerChallenge is NULL, one is generated and response->PeerChallenge - * is filled in. Call this way when generating a response. - * If PeerChallenge is supplied, it is copied into response->PeerChallenge. + * If PeerChallenge is NULL, one is generated and the PeerChallenge + * field of response is filled in. Call this way when generating a response. + * If PeerChallenge is supplied, it is copied into the PeerChallenge field. * Call this way when verifying a response (or debugging). - * Do not call with PeerChallenge = response->PeerChallenge. + * Do not call with PeerChallenge = response. * - * response->PeerChallenge is then used for calculation of the + * The PeerChallenge field of response is then used for calculation of the * Authenticator Response. */ void -ChapMS2(chap_state *cstate, u_char *rchallenge, u_char *PeerChallenge, - char *user, char *secret, int secret_len, MS_Chap2Response *response, - u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1], int authenticator) +ChapMS2(unsigned char *rchallenge, unsigned char *PeerChallenge, + char *user, char *secret, int secret_len, unsigned char *response, + u_char authResponse[], int authenticator) { /* ARGSUSED */ - u_char *p = response->PeerChallenge; + u_char *p = &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE]; int i; - BZERO(response, sizeof(*response)); + BZERO(response, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN); /* Generate the Peer-Challenge if requested, or copy it if supplied. */ if (!PeerChallenge) - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(response->PeerChallenge); i++) + for (i = 0; i < MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN; i++) *p++ = (u_char) (drand48() * 0xff); else - BCOPY(PeerChallenge, response->PeerChallenge, - sizeof(response->PeerChallenge)); + BCOPY(PeerChallenge, &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], + MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN); /* Generate the NT-Response */ - ChapMS2_NT(rchallenge, response->PeerChallenge, user, - secret, secret_len, response->NTResp); + ChapMS2_NT(rchallenge, &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], user, + secret, secret_len, &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP]); /* Generate the Authenticator Response. */ - GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(secret, secret_len, response->NTResp, - response->PeerChallenge, rchallenge, - user, authResponse); + GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain(secret, secret_len, + &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], + &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], + rchallenge, user, authResponse); + +#ifdef PPP_WITH_MPPE + SetMasterKeys(secret, secret_len, + &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], authenticator); +#endif +} - cstate->resp_length = MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN; -#ifdef MPPE - SetMasterKeys(secret, secret_len, response->NTResp, authenticator); - mppe_keys_set = 1; -#endif +static struct chap_digest_type chapms_digest = { + CHAP_MICROSOFT, /* code */ + chapms_generate_challenge, + chapms_verify_response, + chapms_make_response, + NULL, /* check_success */ + chapms_handle_failure, +}; + +static struct chap_digest_type chapms2_digest = { + CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2, /* code */ + chapms2_generate_challenge, + chapms2_verify_response, + chapms2_make_response, + chapms2_check_success, + chapms_handle_failure, +}; + +#ifndef UNIT_TEST +void +chapms_init(void) +{ + chap_register_digest(&chapms_digest); + chap_register_digest(&chapms2_digest); + ppp_add_options(chapms_option_list); +} +#else + +#include + +int debug = 1; +int error_count = 0; +int unsuccess = 0; + +void random_bytes(unsigned char *bytes, int len) +{ + int i = 0; + srand(time(NULL)); + while (i < len) { + bytes[i++] = (unsigned char) rand(); + } +} + + +int test_chap_v1(void) { + char *secret = "MyPw"; + + unsigned char challenge[8] = { + 0x10, 0x2D, 0xB5, 0xDF, 0x08, 0x5D, 0x30, 0x41 + }; + unsigned char response[MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN] = { + }; + unsigned char result[MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN] = { + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + + 0x4E, 0x9D, 0x3C, 0x8F, 0x9C, 0xFD, 0x38, 0x5D, + 0x5B, 0xF4, 0xD3, 0x24, 0x67, 0x91, 0x95, 0x6C, + 0xA4, 0xC3, 0x51, 0xAB, 0x40, 0x9A, 0x3D, 0x61, + + 0x01 + }; + + ChapMS(challenge, secret, strlen(secret), response); + return memcmp(response, result, MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN); +} + +int test_chap_v2(void) { + char *secret = "clientPass"; + char *name = "User"; + + char saresponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]; + char *saresult = "407A5589115FD0D6209F510FE9C04566932CDA56"; + + unsigned char authenticator[16] = { + 0x5B, 0x5D, 0x7C, 0x7D, 0x7B, 0x3F, 0x2F, 0x3E, + 0x3C, 0x2C, 0x60, 0x21, 0x32, 0x26, 0x26, 0x28 + }; + unsigned char peerchallenge[16] = { + 0x21, 0x40, 0x23, 0x24, 0x25, 0x5E, 0x26, 0x2A, + 0x28, 0x29, 0x5F, 0x2B, 0x3A, 0x33, 0x7C, 0x7E + }; + unsigned char result[MS_CHAP_NTRESP_LEN] = { + 0x82, 0x30, 0x9E, 0xCD, 0x8D, 0x70, 0x8B, 0x5E, + 0xA0, 0x8F, 0xAA, 0x39, 0x81, 0xCD, 0x83, 0x54, + 0x42, 0x33, 0x11, 0x4A, 0x3D, 0x85, 0xD6, 0xDF + }; + + unsigned char response[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN] = { + }; + + ChapMS2(authenticator, peerchallenge, name, + secret, strlen(secret), response, + (unsigned char *)saresponse, MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATOR); + + return memcmp(&response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], result, MS_CHAP2_NTRESP_LEN) || + strncmp(saresponse, saresult, MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH); +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { + + PPP_crypto_init(); + + if (test_chap_v1()) { + printf("CHAPv1 failed\n"); + return -1; + } + + if (test_chap_v2()) { + printf("CHAPv2 failed\n"); + return -1; + } + + PPP_crypto_deinit(); + + printf("Success\n"); + return 0; } +#endif /* UNIT_TEST */ -#endif /* CHAPMS */