/*
- * Copyright (c) 2011
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Rustam Kovhaev. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2021 Eivind Næss. All rights reserved.
*
- * Authors:
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
*
- * Rustam Kovhaev <rkovhaev@gmail.com>
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
+ * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN
+ * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * NOTES:
*
* PEAP has 2 phases,
* 1 - Outer EAP, where TLS session gets established
- * 2 - Inner EAP, where inside TLS session with EAP MSCHAPV2 auth, or any
- * other auth
+ * 2 - Inner EAP, where inside TLS session with EAP MSCHAPV2 auth, or any other auth
*
* And so protocols encapsulation looks like this:
* Outer EAP -> TLS -> Inner EAP -> MSCHAPV2
* b) Inner EAP fragmentation
* c) Any other auth other than MSCHAPV2
*
+ * For details on the PEAP protocol, look to Microsoft:
+ * https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-peap
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <net/ppp_defs.h>
+
#include "pppd.h"
#include "eap.h"
+#include "tls.h"
#include "chap-new.h"
#include "chap_ms.h"
+#include "mppe.h"
#include "peap.h"
+#ifdef UNIT_TEST
+#define novm(x)
+#endif
+
struct peap_state {
SSL_CTX *ctx;
SSL *ssl;
BIO *in_bio;
BIO *out_bio;
+ int phase;
int written, read;
u_char *in_buf;
u_char *out_buf;
u_char ipmk[PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN];
u_char tk[PEAP_TLV_TK_LEN];
u_char nonce[PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN];
-};
-
-static struct peap_state *psm;
-static int peap_phase;
-extern bool tls_verify_cert;
-static bool init;
-
-static void ssl_init()
-{
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
- SSL_library_init();
- SSL_load_error_strings();
+ struct tls_info *info;
+#ifdef PPP_WITH_CHAPMS
+ struct chap_digest_type *chap;
#endif
- init = 1;
-}
+};
/*
* K = Key, S = Seed, LEN = output length
size_t max_iter, i, j, k;
u_int len;
- max_iter = (pfr_len + SHA_HASH_LEN - 1) / SHA_HASH_LEN;
- buf = malloc(seed_len + max_iter * SHA_HASH_LEN);
+ max_iter = (pfr_len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1) / SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ buf = malloc(seed_len + max_iter * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (!buf)
novm("pfr buffer");
- hash = malloc(pfr_len + SHA_HASH_LEN);
+ hash = malloc(pfr_len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
if (!hash)
novm("hash buffer");
k = 0;
if (i > 0)
- j = SHA_HASH_LEN;
+ j = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
for (k = 0; k < seed_len; k++)
buf[j + k] = seed[k];
pos = j + k;
pos++;
buf[pos] = 0x00;
pos++;
- if (!HMAC(EVP_sha1(), key, key_len, buf, pos, (hash + i * SHA_HASH_LEN), &len))
+ if (!HMAC(EVP_sha1(), key, key_len, buf, pos, (hash + i * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH), &len))
fatal("HMAC() failed");
- for (j = 0; j < SHA_HASH_LEN; j++)
- buf[j] = hash[i * SHA_HASH_LEN + j];
+ for (j = 0; j < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; j++)
+ buf[j] = hash[i * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + j];
}
BCOPY(hash, out_buf, pfr_len);
free(hash);
free(buf);
}
-static void generate_cmk(u_char *tempkey, u_char *nonce, u_char *tlv_response_out, int client)
+static void generate_cmk(u_char *ipmk, u_char *tempkey, u_char *nonce, u_char *tlv_response_out, int client)
{
const char *label = PEAP_TLV_IPMK_SEED_LABEL;
u_char data_tlv[PEAP_TLV_DATA_LEN] = {0};
u_char compound_mac[PEAP_TLV_COMP_MAC_LEN] = {0};
u_int len;
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP CB: generate compound mac");
/* format outgoing CB TLV response packet */
data_tlv[1] = PEAP_TLV_TYPE;
data_tlv[3] = PEAP_TLV_LENGTH_FIELD;
BCOPY(nonce, (data_tlv + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN), PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN);
data_tlv[60] = EAPT_PEAP;
- BCOPY(mppe_send_key, isk, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
- BCOPY(mppe_recv_key, isk + MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
+#ifdef PPP_WITH_MPPE
+ mppe_get_send_key(isk, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
+ mppe_get_recv_key(isk + MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
+#endif
BCOPY(label, ipmkseed, strlen(label));
BCOPY(isk, ipmkseed + strlen(label), PEAP_TLV_ISK_LEN);
peap_prfplus(ipmkseed, PEAP_TLV_IPMKSEED_LEN,
tempkey, PEAP_TLV_TEMPKEY_LEN, buf, PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN + PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN);
- BCOPY(buf, psm->ipmk, PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN);
+ BCOPY(buf, ipmk, PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN);
BCOPY(buf + PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN, cmk, PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN);
if (!HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cmk, PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN, data_tlv, PEAP_TLV_DATA_LEN, compound_mac, &len))
fatal("HMAC() failed");
BCOPY(data_tlv, tlv_response_out, PEAP_TLV_DATA_LEN - 1);
}
-static void verify_compound_mac(u_char *in_buf)
+static void verify_compound_mac(struct peap_state *psm, u_char *in_buf)
{
u_char nonce[PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN] = {0};
u_char out_buf[PEAP_TLV_LEN] = {0};
BCOPY(in_buf, nonce, PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN);
- generate_cmk(psm->tk, nonce, out_buf, 0);
+ generate_cmk(psm->ipmk, psm->tk, nonce, out_buf, 0);
if (memcmp((in_buf + PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN), (out_buf + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN), PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN))
fatal("server's CMK does not match client's CMK, potential MiTM");
}
-static void generate_mppe_keys(void)
+#ifdef PPP_WITH_MPPE
+#define PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN 32
+
+static void generate_mppe_keys(u_char *ipmk, int client)
{
const char *label = PEAP_TLV_CSK_SEED_LABEL;
u_char csk[PEAP_TLV_CSK_LEN] = {0};
size_t len;
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP CB: generate mppe keys");
+ dbglog("PEAP CB: generate mppe keys");
len = strlen(label);
len++; /* CSK requires NULL byte in seed */
- peap_prfplus((u_char *)label, len, psm->ipmk, PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN, csk, PEAP_TLV_CSK_LEN);
+ peap_prfplus((u_char *)label, len, ipmk, PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN, csk, PEAP_TLV_CSK_LEN);
/*
* The first 64 bytes of the CSK are split into two MPPE keys, as follows.
* | MS-MPPE-Send-Key | MS-MPPE-Recv-Key |
* +-----------------------+------------------------+
*/
- BCOPY(csk, mppe_send_key, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
- BCOPY(csk + 32, mppe_recv_key, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
+ if (client) {
+ mppe_set_keys(csk, csk + PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN, PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN);
+ } else {
+ mppe_set_keys(csk + PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN, csk, PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN);
+ }
}
-static void dump(u_char *buf, int len)
-{
- int i = 0;
+#endif
- dbglog("len: %d bytes", len);
- for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
- printf("%02x ", buf[i]);
- printf("\n");
-}
+#ifndef UNIT_TEST
static void peap_ack(eap_state *esp, u_char id)
{
static void peap_response(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *buf, int len)
{
+ struct peap_state *psm = esp->ea_peap;
u_char *outp;
int peap_len;
PUTCHAR(id, outp);
esp->es_client.ea_id = id;
- if (peap_phase == PEAP_PHASE_1)
+ if (psm->phase == PEAP_PHASE_1)
peap_len = PEAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD + len;
else
peap_len = PEAP_HEADERLEN + len;
PUTSHORT(peap_len, outp);
PUTCHAR(EAPT_PEAP, outp);
- if (peap_phase == PEAP_PHASE_1) {
+ if (psm->phase == PEAP_PHASE_1) {
PUTCHAR(PEAP_L_FLAG_SET, outp);
PUTLONG(len, outp);
} else
output(esp->es_unit, outpacket_buf, PPP_HDRLEN + peap_len);
}
-void do_inner_eap(u_char *in_buf, int in_len, eap_state *esp, int id,
- char *rhostname, u_char *out_buf, int *out_len)
+void peap_do_inner_eap(u_char *in_buf, int in_len, eap_state *esp, int id,
+ u_char *out_buf, int *out_len)
{
- if (debug)
- dump(in_buf, in_len);
- int used;
- u_char *outp;
+ struct peap_state *psm = esp->ea_peap;
+ int used = 0;
+ int typenum;
+ int secret_len;
+ char secret[MAXSECRETLEN + 1];
+ char rhostname[MAXWORDLEN];
+ u_char *outp = out_buf;
- used = 0;
- outp = out_buf;
+ dbglog("PEAP: EAP (in): %.*B", in_len, in_buf);
- if (*in_buf == EAPT_IDENTITY && in_len == 1) {
- PUTCHAR(EAPT_IDENTITY, outp);
- used++;
- BCOPY(esp->es_client.ea_name, outp,
- esp->es_client.ea_namelen);
- used += esp->es_client.ea_namelen;
- } else if (*(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN) == PEAP_CAPABILITIES_TYPE &&
+ if (*(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN) == PEAP_CAPABILITIES_TYPE &&
in_len == (EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN)) {
/* use original packet as template for response */
BCOPY(in_buf, outp, EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN);
/* change last byte to 0 to disable fragmentation */
*(outp + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN + 1) = 0x00;
used = EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN;
- } else if (*in_buf == EAPT_TLS && in_len == 2) {
- /* send NAK to EAP_TLS request */
- PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp);
- used++;
- PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
- used++;
- } else if (*in_buf == EAPT_MSCHAPV2 && *(in_buf + 1) == CHAP_CHALLENGE) {
- /* MSCHAPV2 auth */
- int secret_len;
- char secret[MAXSECRETLEN + 1];
- char *user;
- u_char user_len;
- u_char response[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN];
- u_char auth_response[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 1];
- u_char chap_id;
- u_char rchallenge[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN];
-
- user = esp->es_client.ea_name;
- user_len = esp->es_client.ea_namelen;
- chap_id = *(in_buf + 2);
- BCOPY((in_buf + 6), rchallenge, MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN);
- if (!get_secret(esp->es_unit, esp->es_client.ea_name,
- rhostname, secret, &secret_len, 0))
- fatal("Can't read password file");
- /* MSCHAPV2 response */
- ChapMS2(rchallenge, NULL, esp->es_client.ea_name,
- secret, secret_len, response, auth_response, MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATEE);
- PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
- PUTCHAR(CHAP_RESPONSE, outp);
- PUTCHAR(chap_id, outp);
- PUTCHAR(0, outp);
- PUTCHAR(5 + user_len + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN, outp);
- PUTCHAR(MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN, outp)
- BCOPY(response, outp, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN);
- outp = outp + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN;
- BCOPY(user, outp, user_len);
- used = 5 + user_len + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN + 1;
- } else if (*in_buf == EAPT_MSCHAPV2 && *(in_buf + 1) == CHAP_SUCCESS) {
- PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
- used++;
- PUTCHAR(CHAP_SUCCESS, outp);
- used++;
- auth_peer_success(esp->es_unit, PPP_CHAP, CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2,
- esp->es_server.ea_peer, esp->es_server.ea_peerlen);
- } else if (*(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN) == PEAP_TLV_TYPE &&
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (*(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN) == PEAP_TLV_TYPE &&
in_len == PEAP_TLV_LEN) {
/* PEAP TLV message, do cryptobinding */
SSL_export_keying_material(psm->ssl, psm->tk, PEAP_TLV_TK_LEN,
PEAP_TLV_TK_SEED_LABEL, strlen(PEAP_TLV_TK_SEED_LABEL), NULL, 0, 0);
/* verify server's CMK */
- verify_compound_mac(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_RESULT_LEN + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN);
+ verify_compound_mac(psm, in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_RESULT_LEN + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN);
/* generate client's CMK with new nonce */
PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp);
PUTCHAR(id, outp);
BCOPY(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN, outp, PEAP_TLV_RESULT_LEN);
outp = outp + PEAP_TLV_RESULT_LEN;
RAND_bytes(psm->nonce, PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN);
- generate_cmk(psm->tk, psm->nonce, outp, 1);
+ generate_cmk(psm->ipmk, psm->tk, psm->nonce, outp, 1);
+#ifdef PPP_WITH_MPPE
/* set mppe keys */
- generate_mppe_keys();
+ generate_mppe_keys(psm->ipmk, 1);
+#endif
used = PEAP_TLV_LEN;
- } else {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ GETCHAR(typenum, in_buf);
+ in_len--;
+
+ switch (typenum) {
+ case EAPT_IDENTITY:
+ /* Respond with our identity to the peer */
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_IDENTITY, outp);
+ BCOPY(esp->es_client.ea_name, outp,
+ esp->es_client.ea_namelen);
+ used += (esp->es_client.ea_namelen + 1);
+ break;
+
+ case EAPT_TLS:
+ /* Send NAK to EAP_TLS request */
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
+ used += 2;
+ break;
+
+#if PPP_WITH_CHAPMS
+ case EAPT_MSCHAPV2: {
+
+ // Must have at least 4 more bytes to process CHAP header
+ if (in_len < 4) {
+ error("PEAP: received invalid MSCHAPv2 packet, too short");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ u_char opcode;
+ GETCHAR(opcode, in_buf);
+
+ u_char chap_id;
+ GETCHAR(chap_id, in_buf);
+
+ short mssize;
+ GETSHORT(mssize, in_buf);
+
+ // Validate the CHAP packet (including header)
+ if (in_len != mssize) {
+ error("PEAP: received invalid MSCHAPv2 packet, invalid length");
+ break;
+ }
+ in_len -= 4;
+
+ switch (opcode) {
+ case CHAP_CHALLENGE: {
+
+ u_char *challenge = in_buf; // VLEN + VALUE
+ u_char vsize;
+
+ GETCHAR(vsize, in_buf);
+ in_len -= 1;
+
+ if (vsize != MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN || in_len < MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN) {
+ error("PEAP: received invalid MSCHAPv2 packet, invalid value-length: %d", vsize);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ INCPTR(MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN, in_buf);
+ in_len -= MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN;
+
+ // Copy the provided remote host name
+ rhostname[0] = '\0';
+ if (in_len > 0) {
+ if (in_len >= sizeof(rhostname)) {
+ dbglog("PEAP: trimming really long peer name down");
+ in_len = sizeof(rhostname) - 1;
+ }
+ BCOPY(in_buf, rhostname, in_len);
+ rhostname[in_len] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ // In case the remote doesn't give us his name, or user explictly specified remotename is config
+ if (explicit_remote || (remote_name[0] != '\0' && in_len == 0))
+ strlcpy(rhostname, remote_name, sizeof(rhostname));
+
+ // Get the scrert for authenticating ourselves with the specified host
+ if (get_secret(esp->es_unit, esp->es_client.ea_name,
+ rhostname, secret, &secret_len, 0)) {
+
+ u_char response[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN+1];
+ u_char user_len = esp->es_client.ea_namelen;
+ char *user = esp->es_client.ea_name;
+
+ psm->chap->make_response(response, chap_id, user,
+ challenge, secret, secret_len, NULL);
+
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(CHAP_RESPONSE, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(chap_id, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(0, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(5 + user_len + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN, outp);
+ BCOPY(response, outp, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN+1); // VLEN + VALUE
+ INCPTR(MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN+1, outp);
+ BCOPY(user, outp, user_len);
+ used = 5 + user_len + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN + 1;
+
+ } else {
+ dbglog("PEAP: no CHAP secret for auth to %q", rhostname);
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp);
+ ++used;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case CHAP_SUCCESS: {
+
+ u_char status = CHAP_FAILURE;
+ if (psm->chap->check_success(chap_id, in_buf, in_len)) {
+ info("Chap authentication succeeded! %.*v", in_len, in_buf);
+ status = CHAP_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(status, outp);
+ used += 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ case CHAP_FAILURE: {
+
+ psm->chap->handle_failure(in_buf, in_len);
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(status, outp);
+ used += 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ } // EAPT_MSCHAPv2
+#endif
+ default:
+
/* send compressed EAP NAK for any unknown packet */
PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp);
++used;
}
- if (debug)
- dump(psm->out_buf, used);
+done:
+
+ dbglog("PEAP: EAP (out): %.*B", used, psm->out_buf);
*out_len = used;
}
-void allocate_buffers(void)
+int peap_init(struct peap_state **ctx, const char *rhostname)
{
const SSL_METHOD *method;
- psm = malloc(sizeof(*psm));
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -1;
+
+ tls_init();
+
+ struct peap_state *psm = malloc(sizeof(*psm));
if (!psm)
novm("peap psm struct");
psm->in_buf = malloc(TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
psm->out_buf = malloc(TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
if (!psm->out_buf)
novm("peap tls buffer");
- method = TLS_method();
+ method = tls_method();
if (!method)
novm("TLS_method() failed");
psm->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
if (!psm->ctx)
novm("SSL_CTX_new() failed");
- if (!tls_verify_cert)
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(psm->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
- else
- SSL_CTX_set_verify(psm->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL);
- info("PEAP: SSL certificate validation is %s", tls_verify_cert ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+ /* Configure the default options */
+ tls_set_opts(psm->ctx);
+
+ /* Configure the max TLS version */
+ tls_set_version(psm->ctx, max_tls_version);
- SSL_CTX_set_options(psm->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 | SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
+ /* Configure the peer certificate callback */
+ tls_set_verify(psm->ctx, 5);
+
+ /* Configure CA locations */
+ if (tls_set_ca(psm->ctx, ca_path, cacert_file)) {
+ fatal("Could not set CA verify locations");
+ }
+
+ /* Configure CRL check (if any) */
+ if (tls_set_crl(psm->ctx, crl_dir, crl_file)) {
+ fatal("Could not set CRL verify locations");
+ }
psm->out_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
psm->in_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
psm->ssl = SSL_new(psm->ctx);
SSL_set_bio(psm->ssl, psm->in_bio, psm->out_bio);
SSL_set_connect_state(psm->ssl);
- peap_phase = PEAP_PHASE_1;
+ psm->phase = PEAP_PHASE_1;
+ tls_set_verify_info(psm->ssl, explicit_remote ? rhostname : NULL, NULL, 1, &psm->info);
+ psm->chap = chap_find_digest(CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2);
+ *ctx = psm;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void peap_finish(struct peap_state **psm) {
+
+ if (psm && *psm) {
+ struct peap_state *tmp = *psm;
+
+ if (tmp->ssl)
+ SSL_free(tmp->ssl);
+
+ if (tmp->ctx)
+ SSL_CTX_free(tmp->ctx);
+
+ if (tmp->info)
+ tls_free_verify_info(&tmp->info);
+
+ // NOTE: BIO and memory is freed as a part of SSL_free()
+
+ free(*psm);
+ *psm = NULL;
+ }
}
-void peap_process(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len, char *rhostname)
+int peap_process(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len)
{
int ret;
int out_len;
- if (!init)
- ssl_init();
+ struct peap_state *psm = esp->ea_peap;
if (esp->es_client.ea_id == id) {
info("PEAP: retransmits are not supported..");
- return;
+ return -1;
}
switch (*inp) {
case PEAP_S_FLAG_SET:
- allocate_buffers();
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP: S bit is set, starting PEAP phase 1");
+ dbglog("PEAP: S bit is set, starting PEAP phase 1");
ret = SSL_do_handshake(psm->ssl);
if (ret != 1) {
ret = SSL_get_error(psm->ssl, ret);
break;
case PEAP_LM_FLAG_SET:
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP TLS: LM bits are set, need to get more TLS fragments");
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: LM bits are set, need to get more TLS fragments");
inp = inp + PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
peap_ack(esp, id);
break;
case PEAP_M_FLAG_SET:
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP TLS: M bit is set, need to get more TLS fragments");
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: M bit is set, need to get more TLS fragments");
inp = inp + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
peap_ack(esp, id);
case PEAP_L_FLAG_SET:
case PEAP_NO_FLAGS:
if (*inp == PEAP_L_FLAG_SET) {
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP TLS: L bit is set");
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: L bit is set");
inp = inp + PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
} else {
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP TLS: all bits are off");
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: all bits are off");
inp = inp + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
}
- if (peap_phase == PEAP_PHASE_1) {
- if (debug)
- info("PEAP TLS: continue handshake");
+ if (psm->phase == PEAP_PHASE_1) {
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: continue handshake");
ret = SSL_do_handshake(psm->ssl);
if (ret != 1) {
ret = SSL_get_error(psm->ssl, ret);
fatal("SSL_do_handshake(): %s", ERR_error_string(ret, NULL));
}
if (SSL_is_init_finished(psm->ssl))
- peap_phase = PEAP_PHASE_2;
+ psm->phase = PEAP_PHASE_2;
if (BIO_ctrl_pending(psm->out_bio) == 0) {
peap_ack(esp, id);
break;
psm->read = SSL_read(psm->ssl, psm->in_buf,
TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
out_len = TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE;
- do_inner_eap(psm->in_buf, psm->read, esp, id, rhostname,
+ peap_do_inner_eap(psm->in_buf, psm->read, esp, id,
psm->out_buf, &out_len);
- psm->written = SSL_write(psm->ssl, psm->out_buf, out_len);
- psm->read = BIO_read(psm->out_bio, psm->out_buf,
+ if (out_len > 0) {
+ psm->written = SSL_write(psm->ssl, psm->out_buf, out_len);
+ psm->read = BIO_read(psm->out_bio, psm->out_buf,
TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
- peap_response(esp, id, psm->out_buf, psm->read);
+ peap_response(esp, id, psm->out_buf, psm->read);
+ }
break;
}
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+u_char outpacket_buf[255];
+int debug = 1;
+int error_count = 0;
+int unsuccess = 0;
+
+/**
+ * Using the example in MS-PEAP, section 4.4.1.
+ * see https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-peap/5308642b-90c9-4cc4-beec-fb367325c0f9
+ */
+int test_cmk(u_char *ipmk) {
+ u_char nonce[PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN] = {
+ 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA3, 0x87, 0x84, 0x23, 0x74, 0x57,
+ 0xCC, 0xC9, 0x0B, 0x1A, 0x90, 0x8C, 0xBD, 0xF4,
+ 0x71, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x99, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0x8D,
+ 0x3D, 0xB4, 0x4E, 0xCB, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x37, 0xE9
+ };
+
+ u_char tmpkey[PEAP_TLV_TEMPKEY_LEN] = {
+ 0x73, 0x8B, 0xB5, 0xF4, 0x62, 0xD5, 0x8E, 0x7E,
+ 0xD8, 0x44, 0xE1, 0xF0, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0xBE, 0x50,
+ 0xC5, 0x0A, 0x20, 0x50, 0xDE, 0x11, 0x99, 0x77,
+ 0x10, 0xD6, 0x5F, 0x45, 0xFB, 0x5F, 0xBA, 0xB7,
+ 0xE3, 0x18, 0x1E, 0x92, 0x4F, 0x42, 0x97, 0x38,
+ // 0xDE, 0x40, 0xC8, 0x46, 0xCD, 0xF5, 0x0B, 0xCB,
+ // 0xF9, 0xCE, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x85, 0x1D, 0x22, 0x52,
+ // 0x45, 0x3B, 0xDF, 0x63
+ };
+
+ u_char expected[60] = {
+ 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x38, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA3, 0x87, 0x84, 0x23, 0x74, 0x57,
+ 0xCC, 0xC9, 0x0B, 0x1A, 0x90, 0x8C, 0xBD, 0xF4,
+ 0x71, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x99, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0x8D,
+ 0x3D, 0xB4, 0x4E, 0xCB, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x37, 0xE9,
+ 0x42, 0xE0, 0x86, 0x07, 0x1D, 0x1C, 0x8B, 0x8C,
+ 0x8E, 0x45, 0x8F, 0x70, 0x21, 0xF0, 0x6A, 0x6E,
+ 0xAB, 0x16, 0xB6, 0x46
+ };
+
+ u_char inner_mppe_keys[32] = {
+ 0x67, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x14, 0x01, 0xBE, 0xFB, 0xA5,
+ 0x60, 0x71, 0x7B, 0x3B, 0x5D, 0xDD, 0x40, 0x38,
+ 0x65, 0x67, 0xF9, 0xF4, 0x16, 0xFD, 0x3E, 0x9D,
+ 0xFC, 0x71, 0x16, 0x3B, 0xDF, 0xF2, 0xFA, 0x95
+ };
+
+ u_char response[60] = {};
+
+ // Set the inner MPPE keys (e.g. from CHAPv2)
+ mppe_set_keys(inner_mppe_keys, inner_mppe_keys + 16, 16);
+
+ // Generate and compare the response
+ generate_cmk(ipmk, tmpkey, nonce, response, 1);
+ if (memcmp(expected, response, sizeof(response)) != 0) {
+ dbglog("Failed CMK key generation\n");
+ dbglog("%.*B", sizeof(response), response);
+ dbglog("%.*B", sizeof(expected), expected);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int test_mppe(u_char *ipmk) {
+ u_char outer_mppe_send_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_SIZE] = {
+ 0x6A, 0x02, 0xD7, 0x82, 0x20, 0x1B, 0xC7, 0x13,
+ 0x8B, 0xF8, 0xEF, 0xF7, 0x33, 0xB4, 0x96, 0x97,
+ 0x0D, 0x7C, 0xAB, 0x30, 0x0A, 0xC9, 0x57, 0x72,
+ 0x78, 0xE1, 0xDD, 0xD5, 0xAE, 0xF7, 0x66, 0x97
+ };
+
+ u_char outer_mppe_recv_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_SIZE] = {
+ 0x17, 0x52, 0xD4, 0xE5, 0x84, 0xA1, 0xC8, 0x95,
+ 0x03, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x05, 0xE3, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x84,
+ 0x84, 0xDD, 0xC2, 0xAA, 0x6E, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0x62,
+ 0x76, 0x5C, 0x40, 0x68, 0xBF, 0xF6, 0x5A, 0x45
+ };
+
+ u_char result[MPPE_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+ int len;
+
+ mppe_clear_keys();
+
+ generate_mppe_keys(ipmk, 1);
+
+ len = mppe_get_recv_key(result, sizeof(result));
+ if (len != sizeof(result)) {
+ dbglog("Invalid length of resulting MPPE recv key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(result, outer_mppe_recv_key, len) != 0) {
+ dbglog("Invalid result for outer mppe recv key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ len = mppe_get_send_key(result, sizeof(result));
+ if (len != sizeof(result)) {
+ dbglog("Invalid length of resulting MPPE send key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(result, outer_mppe_send_key, len) != 0) {
+ dbglog("Invalid result for outer mppe send key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ u_char ipmk[PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN] = {
+ 0x3A, 0x91, 0x1C, 0x25, 0x54, 0x73, 0xE8, 0x3E,
+ 0x9A, 0x0C, 0xC3, 0x33, 0xAE, 0x1F, 0x8A, 0x35,
+ 0xCD, 0xC7, 0x41, 0x63, 0xE7, 0xF6, 0x0F, 0x6C,
+ 0x65, 0xEF, 0x71, 0xC2, 0x64, 0x42, 0xAA, 0xAC,
+ 0xA2, 0xB6, 0xF1, 0xEB, 0x4F, 0x25, 0xEC, 0xA3,
+ };
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ ret = test_cmk(ipmk);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = test_mppe(ipmk);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
+
+#endif
projects / ppp.git / blobdiff