--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Rustam Kovhaev. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2021 Eivind Næss. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. The name(s) of the authors of this software must not be used to
+ * endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ * prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THE AUTHORS OF THIS SOFTWARE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
+ * AND FITNESS, IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * SPECIAL, INDIRECT OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN
+ * AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * NOTES:
+ *
+ * PEAP has 2 phases,
+ * 1 - Outer EAP, where TLS session gets established
+ * 2 - Inner EAP, where inside TLS session with EAP MSCHAPV2 auth, or any other auth
+ *
+ * And so protocols encapsulation looks like this:
+ * Outer EAP -> TLS -> Inner EAP -> MSCHAPV2
+ * PEAP can compress an inner EAP packet prior to encapsulating it within
+ * the Data field of a PEAP packet by removing its Code, Identifier,
+ * and Length fields, and Microsoft PEAP server/client always does that
+ *
+ * Current implementation does not support:
+ * a) Fast reconnect
+ * b) Inner EAP fragmentation
+ * c) Any other auth other than MSCHAPV2
+ *
+ * For details on the PEAP protocol, look to Microsoft:
+ * https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-peap
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <net/ppp_defs.h>
+
+#include "pppd.h"
+#include "eap.h"
+#include "tls.h"
+#include "chap-new.h"
+#include "chap_ms.h"
+#include "mppe.h"
+#include "peap.h"
+
+#ifdef UNIT_TEST
+#define novm(x)
+#endif
+
+struct peap_state {
+ SSL_CTX *ctx;
+ SSL *ssl;
+ BIO *in_bio;
+ BIO *out_bio;
+
+ int phase;
+ int written, read;
+ u_char *in_buf;
+ u_char *out_buf;
+
+ u_char ipmk[PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN];
+ u_char tk[PEAP_TLV_TK_LEN];
+ u_char nonce[PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN];
+ struct tls_info *info;
+#ifdef CHAPMS
+ struct chap_digest_type *chap;
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * K = Key, S = Seed, LEN = output length
+ * PRF+(K, S, LEN) = T1 | T2 | ... |Tn
+ * Where:
+ * T1 = HMAC-SHA1 (K, S | 0x01 | 0x00 | 0x00)
+ * T2 = HMAC-SHA1 (K, T1 | S | 0x02 | 0x00 | 0x00)
+ * ...
+ * Tn = HMAC-SHA1 (K, Tn-1 | S | n | 0x00 | 0x00)
+ * As shown, PRF+ is computed in iterations. The number of iterations (n)
+ * depends on the output length (LEN).
+ */
+static void peap_prfplus(u_char *seed, size_t seed_len, u_char *key, size_t key_len, u_char *out_buf, size_t pfr_len)
+{
+ int pos;
+ u_char *buf, *hash;
+ size_t max_iter, i, j, k;
+ u_int len;
+
+ max_iter = (pfr_len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1) / SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ buf = malloc(seed_len + max_iter * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (!buf)
+ novm("pfr buffer");
+ hash = malloc(pfr_len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ if (!hash)
+ novm("hash buffer");
+
+ for (i = 0; i < max_iter; i++) {
+ j = 0;
+ k = 0;
+
+ if (i > 0)
+ j = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ for (k = 0; k < seed_len; k++)
+ buf[j + k] = seed[k];
+ pos = j + k;
+ buf[pos] = i + 1;
+ pos++;
+ buf[pos] = 0x00;
+ pos++;
+ buf[pos] = 0x00;
+ pos++;
+ if (!HMAC(EVP_sha1(), key, key_len, buf, pos, (hash + i * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH), &len))
+ fatal("HMAC() failed");
+ for (j = 0; j < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; j++)
+ buf[j] = hash[i * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + j];
+ }
+ BCOPY(hash, out_buf, pfr_len);
+ free(hash);
+ free(buf);
+}
+
+static void generate_cmk(u_char *ipmk, u_char *tempkey, u_char *nonce, u_char *tlv_response_out, int client)
+{
+ const char *label = PEAP_TLV_IPMK_SEED_LABEL;
+ u_char data_tlv[PEAP_TLV_DATA_LEN] = {0};
+ u_char isk[PEAP_TLV_ISK_LEN] = {0};
+ u_char ipmkseed[PEAP_TLV_IPMKSEED_LEN] = {0};
+ u_char cmk[PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN] = {0};
+ u_char buf[PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN + PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN] = {0};
+ u_char compound_mac[PEAP_TLV_COMP_MAC_LEN] = {0};
+ u_int len;
+
+ /* format outgoing CB TLV response packet */
+ data_tlv[1] = PEAP_TLV_TYPE;
+ data_tlv[3] = PEAP_TLV_LENGTH_FIELD;
+ if (client)
+ data_tlv[7] = PEAP_TLV_SUBTYPE_RESPONSE;
+ else
+ data_tlv[7] = PEAP_TLV_SUBTYPE_REQUEST;
+ BCOPY(nonce, (data_tlv + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN), PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN);
+ data_tlv[60] = EAPT_PEAP;
+
+#ifdef MPPE
+ mppe_get_send_key(isk, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
+ mppe_get_recv_key(isk + MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN, MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN);
+#endif
+
+ BCOPY(label, ipmkseed, strlen(label));
+ BCOPY(isk, ipmkseed + strlen(label), PEAP_TLV_ISK_LEN);
+ peap_prfplus(ipmkseed, PEAP_TLV_IPMKSEED_LEN,
+ tempkey, PEAP_TLV_TEMPKEY_LEN, buf, PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN + PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN);
+
+ BCOPY(buf, ipmk, PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN);
+ BCOPY(buf + PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN, cmk, PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN);
+ if (!HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cmk, PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN, data_tlv, PEAP_TLV_DATA_LEN, compound_mac, &len))
+ fatal("HMAC() failed");
+ BCOPY(compound_mac, data_tlv + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN, PEAP_TLV_COMP_MAC_LEN);
+ /* do not copy last byte to response packet */
+ BCOPY(data_tlv, tlv_response_out, PEAP_TLV_DATA_LEN - 1);
+}
+
+static void verify_compound_mac(struct peap_state *psm, u_char *in_buf)
+{
+ u_char nonce[PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN] = {0};
+ u_char out_buf[PEAP_TLV_LEN] = {0};
+
+ BCOPY(in_buf, nonce, PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN);
+ generate_cmk(psm->ipmk, psm->tk, nonce, out_buf, 0);
+ if (memcmp((in_buf + PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN), (out_buf + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN), PEAP_TLV_CMK_LEN))
+ fatal("server's CMK does not match client's CMK, potential MiTM");
+}
+
+#ifdef MPPE
+#define PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN 32
+
+static void generate_mppe_keys(u_char *ipmk, int client)
+{
+ const char *label = PEAP_TLV_CSK_SEED_LABEL;
+ u_char csk[PEAP_TLV_CSK_LEN] = {0};
+ size_t len;
+
+ dbglog("PEAP CB: generate mppe keys");
+ len = strlen(label);
+ len++; /* CSK requires NULL byte in seed */
+ peap_prfplus((u_char *)label, len, ipmk, PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN, csk, PEAP_TLV_CSK_LEN);
+
+ /*
+ * The first 64 bytes of the CSK are split into two MPPE keys, as follows.
+ *
+ * +-----------------------+------------------------+
+ * | First 32 bytes of CSK | Second 32 bytes of CSK |
+ * +-----------------------+------------------------+
+ * | MS-MPPE-Send-Key | MS-MPPE-Recv-Key |
+ * +-----------------------+------------------------+
+ */
+ if (client) {
+ mppe_set_keys(csk, csk + PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN, PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN);
+ } else {
+ mppe_set_keys(csk + PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN, csk, PEAP_MPPE_KEY_LEN);
+ }
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef UNIT_TEST
+
+static void peap_ack(eap_state *esp, u_char id)
+{
+ u_char *outp;
+
+ outp = outpacket_buf;
+ MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP);
+ PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(id, outp);
+ esp->es_client.ea_id = id;
+ PUTSHORT(PEAP_HEADERLEN, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_PEAP, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(PEAP_FLAGS_ACK, outp);
+ output(esp->es_unit, outpacket_buf, PPP_HDRLEN + PEAP_HEADERLEN);
+}
+
+static void peap_response(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *buf, int len)
+{
+ struct peap_state *psm = esp->ea_peap;
+ u_char *outp;
+ int peap_len;
+
+ outp = outpacket_buf;
+ MAKEHEADER(outp, PPP_EAP);
+ PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(id, outp);
+ esp->es_client.ea_id = id;
+
+ if (psm->phase == PEAP_PHASE_1)
+ peap_len = PEAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD + len;
+ else
+ peap_len = PEAP_HEADERLEN + len;
+
+ PUTSHORT(peap_len, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_PEAP, outp);
+
+ if (psm->phase == PEAP_PHASE_1) {
+ PUTCHAR(PEAP_L_FLAG_SET, outp);
+ PUTLONG(len, outp);
+ } else
+ PUTCHAR(PEAP_NO_FLAGS, outp);
+
+ BCOPY(buf, outp, len);
+ output(esp->es_unit, outpacket_buf, PPP_HDRLEN + peap_len);
+}
+
+void peap_do_inner_eap(u_char *in_buf, int in_len, eap_state *esp, int id,
+ u_char *out_buf, int *out_len)
+{
+ struct peap_state *psm = esp->ea_peap;
+ int used = 0;
+ int typenum;
+ int secret_len;
+ char secret[MAXSECRETLEN + 1];
+ char rhostname[MAXWORDLEN];
+ u_char *outp = out_buf;
+
+ dbglog("PEAP: EAP (in): %.*B", in_len, in_buf);
+
+ if (*(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN) == PEAP_CAPABILITIES_TYPE &&
+ in_len == (EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN)) {
+ /* use original packet as template for response */
+ BCOPY(in_buf, outp, EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN);
+ PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(id, outp);
+ /* change last byte to 0 to disable fragmentation */
+ *(outp + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN + 1) = 0x00;
+ used = EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_CAPABILITIES_LEN;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (*(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN) == PEAP_TLV_TYPE &&
+ in_len == PEAP_TLV_LEN) {
+ /* PEAP TLV message, do cryptobinding */
+ SSL_export_keying_material(psm->ssl, psm->tk, PEAP_TLV_TK_LEN,
+ PEAP_TLV_TK_SEED_LABEL, strlen(PEAP_TLV_TK_SEED_LABEL), NULL, 0, 0);
+ /* verify server's CMK */
+ verify_compound_mac(psm, in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN + PEAP_TLV_RESULT_LEN + PEAP_TLV_HEADERLEN);
+ /* generate client's CMK with new nonce */
+ PUTCHAR(EAP_RESPONSE, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(id, outp);
+ PUTSHORT(PEAP_TLV_LEN, outp);
+ BCOPY(in_buf + EAP_HEADERLEN, outp, PEAP_TLV_RESULT_LEN);
+ outp = outp + PEAP_TLV_RESULT_LEN;
+ RAND_bytes(psm->nonce, PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN);
+ generate_cmk(psm->ipmk, psm->tk, psm->nonce, outp, 1);
+#ifdef MPPE
+ /* set mppe keys */
+ generate_mppe_keys(psm->ipmk, 1);
+#endif
+ used = PEAP_TLV_LEN;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ GETCHAR(typenum, in_buf);
+ in_len--;
+
+ switch (typenum) {
+ case EAPT_IDENTITY:
+ /* Respond with our identity to the peer */
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_IDENTITY, outp);
+ BCOPY(esp->es_client.ea_name, outp,
+ esp->es_client.ea_namelen);
+ used += (esp->es_client.ea_namelen + 1);
+ break;
+
+ case EAPT_TLS:
+ /* Send NAK to EAP_TLS request */
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
+ used += 2;
+ break;
+
+#if CHAPMS
+ case EAPT_MSCHAPV2: {
+
+ // Must have at least 4 more bytes to process CHAP header
+ if (in_len < 4) {
+ error("PEAP: received invalid MSCHAPv2 packet, too short");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ u_char opcode;
+ GETCHAR(opcode, in_buf);
+
+ u_char chap_id;
+ GETCHAR(chap_id, in_buf);
+
+ short mssize;
+ GETSHORT(mssize, in_buf);
+
+ // Validate the CHAP packet (including header)
+ if (in_len != mssize) {
+ error("PEAP: received invalid MSCHAPv2 packet, invalid length");
+ break;
+ }
+ in_len -= 4;
+
+ switch (opcode) {
+ case CHAP_CHALLENGE: {
+
+ u_char *challenge = in_buf; // VLEN + VALUE
+ u_char vsize;
+
+ GETCHAR(vsize, in_buf);
+ in_len -= 1;
+
+ if (vsize != MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN || in_len < MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN) {
+ error("PEAP: received invalid MSCHAPv2 packet, invalid value-length: %d", vsize);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ INCPTR(MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN, in_buf);
+ in_len -= MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN;
+
+ // Copy the provided remote host name
+ rhostname[0] = '\0';
+ if (in_len > 0) {
+ if (in_len >= sizeof(rhostname)) {
+ dbglog("PEAP: trimming really long peer name down");
+ in_len = sizeof(rhostname) - 1;
+ }
+ BCOPY(in_buf, rhostname, in_len);
+ rhostname[in_len] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ // In case the remote doesn't give us his name, or user explictly specified remotename is config
+ if (explicit_remote || (remote_name[0] != '\0' && in_len == 0))
+ strlcpy(rhostname, remote_name, sizeof(rhostname));
+
+ // Get the scrert for authenticating ourselves with the specified host
+ if (get_secret(esp->es_unit, esp->es_client.ea_name,
+ rhostname, secret, &secret_len, 0)) {
+
+ u_char response[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN+1];
+ u_char user_len = esp->es_client.ea_namelen;
+ char *user = esp->es_client.ea_name;
+
+ psm->chap->make_response(response, chap_id, user,
+ challenge, secret, secret_len, NULL);
+
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(CHAP_RESPONSE, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(chap_id, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(0, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(5 + user_len + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN, outp);
+ BCOPY(response, outp, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN+1); // VLEN + VALUE
+ INCPTR(MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN+1, outp);
+ BCOPY(user, outp, user_len);
+ used = 5 + user_len + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN + 1;
+
+ } else {
+ dbglog("PEAP: no CHAP secret for auth to %q", rhostname);
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp);
+ ++used;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case CHAP_SUCCESS: {
+
+ u_char status = CHAP_FAILURE;
+ if (psm->chap->check_success(chap_id, in_buf, in_len)) {
+ info("Chap authentication succeeded! %.*v", in_len, in_buf);
+ status = CHAP_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(status, outp);
+ used += 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ case CHAP_FAILURE: {
+
+ psm->chap->handle_failure(in_buf, in_len);
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_MSCHAPV2, outp);
+ PUTCHAR(status, outp);
+ used += 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ } // EAPT_MSCHAPv2
+#endif
+ default:
+
+ /* send compressed EAP NAK for any unknown packet */
+ PUTCHAR(EAPT_NAK, outp);
+ ++used;
+ }
+
+done:
+
+ dbglog("PEAP: EAP (out): %.*B", used, psm->out_buf);
+ *out_len = used;
+}
+
+int peap_init(struct peap_state **ctx, const char *rhostname)
+{
+ const SSL_METHOD *method;
+
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -1;
+
+ tls_init();
+
+ struct peap_state *psm = malloc(sizeof(*psm));
+ if (!psm)
+ novm("peap psm struct");
+ psm->in_buf = malloc(TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
+ if (!psm->in_buf)
+ novm("peap tls buffer");
+ psm->out_buf = malloc(TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
+ if (!psm->out_buf)
+ novm("peap tls buffer");
+ method = tls_method();
+ if (!method)
+ novm("TLS_method() failed");
+ psm->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(method);
+ if (!psm->ctx)
+ novm("SSL_CTX_new() failed");
+
+ /* Configure the default options */
+ tls_set_opts(psm->ctx);
+
+ /* Configure the max TLS version */
+ tls_set_version(psm->ctx, max_tls_version);
+
+ /* Configure the peer certificate callback */
+ tls_set_verify(psm->ctx, 5);
+
+ /* Configure CA locations */
+ if (tls_set_ca(psm->ctx, ca_path, cacert_file)) {
+ fatal("Could not set CA verify locations");
+ }
+
+ /* Configure CRL check (if any) */
+ if (tls_set_crl(psm->ctx, crl_dir, crl_file)) {
+ fatal("Could not set CRL verify locations");
+ }
+
+ psm->out_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ psm->in_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ BIO_set_mem_eof_return(psm->out_bio, -1);
+ BIO_set_mem_eof_return(psm->in_bio, -1);
+ psm->ssl = SSL_new(psm->ctx);
+ SSL_set_bio(psm->ssl, psm->in_bio, psm->out_bio);
+ SSL_set_connect_state(psm->ssl);
+ psm->phase = PEAP_PHASE_1;
+ tls_set_verify_info(psm->ssl, explicit_remote ? rhostname : NULL, NULL, 1, &psm->info);
+ psm->chap = chap_find_digest(CHAP_MICROSOFT_V2);
+ *ctx = psm;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void peap_finish(struct peap_state **psm) {
+
+ if (psm && *psm) {
+ struct peap_state *tmp = *psm;
+
+ if (tmp->ssl)
+ SSL_free(tmp->ssl);
+
+ if (tmp->ctx)
+ SSL_CTX_free(tmp->ctx);
+
+ if (tmp->info)
+ tls_free_verify_info(&tmp->info);
+
+ // NOTE: BIO and memory is freed as a part of SSL_free()
+
+ free(*psm);
+ *psm = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+int peap_process(eap_state *esp, u_char id, u_char *inp, int len)
+{
+ int ret;
+ int out_len;
+
+ struct peap_state *psm = esp->ea_peap;
+
+ if (esp->es_client.ea_id == id) {
+ info("PEAP: retransmits are not supported..");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ switch (*inp) {
+ case PEAP_S_FLAG_SET:
+ dbglog("PEAP: S bit is set, starting PEAP phase 1");
+ ret = SSL_do_handshake(psm->ssl);
+ if (ret != 1) {
+ ret = SSL_get_error(psm->ssl, ret);
+ if (ret != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ && ret != SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
+ fatal("SSL_do_handshake(): %s", ERR_error_string(ret, NULL));
+
+ }
+ psm->read = BIO_read(psm->out_bio, psm->out_buf, TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
+ peap_response(esp, id, psm->out_buf, psm->read);
+ break;
+
+ case PEAP_LM_FLAG_SET:
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: LM bits are set, need to get more TLS fragments");
+ inp = inp + PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
+ psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
+ peap_ack(esp, id);
+ break;
+
+ case PEAP_M_FLAG_SET:
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: M bit is set, need to get more TLS fragments");
+ inp = inp + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
+ psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
+ peap_ack(esp, id);
+ break;
+
+ case PEAP_L_FLAG_SET:
+ case PEAP_NO_FLAGS:
+ if (*inp == PEAP_L_FLAG_SET) {
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: L bit is set");
+ inp = inp + PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
+ psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_FIELD - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
+ } else {
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: all bits are off");
+ inp = inp + PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD;
+ psm->written = BIO_write(psm->in_bio, inp, len - PEAP_FLAGS_FIELD);
+ }
+
+ if (psm->phase == PEAP_PHASE_1) {
+ dbglog("PEAP TLS: continue handshake");
+ ret = SSL_do_handshake(psm->ssl);
+ if (ret != 1) {
+ ret = SSL_get_error(psm->ssl, ret);
+ if (ret != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ && ret != SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
+ fatal("SSL_do_handshake(): %s", ERR_error_string(ret, NULL));
+ }
+ if (SSL_is_init_finished(psm->ssl))
+ psm->phase = PEAP_PHASE_2;
+ if (BIO_ctrl_pending(psm->out_bio) == 0) {
+ peap_ack(esp, id);
+ break;
+ }
+ psm->read = 0;
+ psm->read = BIO_read(psm->out_bio, psm->out_buf,
+ TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
+ peap_response(esp, id, psm->out_buf, psm->read);
+ break;
+ }
+ psm->read = SSL_read(psm->ssl, psm->in_buf,
+ TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
+ out_len = TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE;
+ peap_do_inner_eap(psm->in_buf, psm->read, esp, id,
+ psm->out_buf, &out_len);
+ if (out_len > 0) {
+ psm->written = SSL_write(psm->ssl, psm->out_buf, out_len);
+ psm->read = BIO_read(psm->out_bio, psm->out_buf,
+ TLS_RECORD_MAX_SIZE);
+ peap_response(esp, id, psm->out_buf, psm->read);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+u_char outpacket_buf[255];
+int debug = 1;
+int error_count = 0;
+int unsuccess = 0;
+
+/**
+ * Using the example in MS-PEAP, section 4.4.1.
+ * see https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-peap/5308642b-90c9-4cc4-beec-fb367325c0f9
+ */
+int test_cmk(u_char *ipmk) {
+ u_char nonce[PEAP_TLV_NONCE_LEN] = {
+ 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA3, 0x87, 0x84, 0x23, 0x74, 0x57,
+ 0xCC, 0xC9, 0x0B, 0x1A, 0x90, 0x8C, 0xBD, 0xF4,
+ 0x71, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x99, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0x8D,
+ 0x3D, 0xB4, 0x4E, 0xCB, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x37, 0xE9
+ };
+
+ u_char tmpkey[PEAP_TLV_TEMPKEY_LEN] = {
+ 0x73, 0x8B, 0xB5, 0xF4, 0x62, 0xD5, 0x8E, 0x7E,
+ 0xD8, 0x44, 0xE1, 0xF0, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0xBE, 0x50,
+ 0xC5, 0x0A, 0x20, 0x50, 0xDE, 0x11, 0x99, 0x77,
+ 0x10, 0xD6, 0x5F, 0x45, 0xFB, 0x5F, 0xBA, 0xB7,
+ 0xE3, 0x18, 0x1E, 0x92, 0x4F, 0x42, 0x97, 0x38,
+ // 0xDE, 0x40, 0xC8, 0x46, 0xCD, 0xF5, 0x0B, 0xCB,
+ // 0xF9, 0xCE, 0xDB, 0x1E, 0x85, 0x1D, 0x22, 0x52,
+ // 0x45, 0x3B, 0xDF, 0x63
+ };
+
+ u_char expected[60] = {
+ 0x00, 0x0C, 0x00, 0x38, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x6C, 0x6B, 0xA3, 0x87, 0x84, 0x23, 0x74, 0x57,
+ 0xCC, 0xC9, 0x0B, 0x1A, 0x90, 0x8C, 0xBD, 0xF4,
+ 0x71, 0x1B, 0x69, 0x99, 0x4D, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0x8D,
+ 0x3D, 0xB4, 0x4E, 0xCB, 0xCD, 0xAD, 0x37, 0xE9,
+ 0x42, 0xE0, 0x86, 0x07, 0x1D, 0x1C, 0x8B, 0x8C,
+ 0x8E, 0x45, 0x8F, 0x70, 0x21, 0xF0, 0x6A, 0x6E,
+ 0xAB, 0x16, 0xB6, 0x46
+ };
+
+ u_char inner_mppe_keys[32] = {
+ 0x67, 0x3E, 0x96, 0x14, 0x01, 0xBE, 0xFB, 0xA5,
+ 0x60, 0x71, 0x7B, 0x3B, 0x5D, 0xDD, 0x40, 0x38,
+ 0x65, 0x67, 0xF9, 0xF4, 0x16, 0xFD, 0x3E, 0x9D,
+ 0xFC, 0x71, 0x16, 0x3B, 0xDF, 0xF2, 0xFA, 0x95
+ };
+
+ u_char response[60] = {};
+
+ // Set the inner MPPE keys (e.g. from CHAPv2)
+ mppe_set_keys(inner_mppe_keys, inner_mppe_keys + 16, 16);
+
+ // Generate and compare the response
+ generate_cmk(ipmk, tmpkey, nonce, response, 1);
+ if (memcmp(expected, response, sizeof(response)) != 0) {
+ dbglog("Failed CMK key generation\n");
+ dbglog("%.*B", sizeof(response), response);
+ dbglog("%.*B", sizeof(expected), expected);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int test_mppe(u_char *ipmk) {
+ u_char outer_mppe_send_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_SIZE] = {
+ 0x6A, 0x02, 0xD7, 0x82, 0x20, 0x1B, 0xC7, 0x13,
+ 0x8B, 0xF8, 0xEF, 0xF7, 0x33, 0xB4, 0x96, 0x97,
+ 0x0D, 0x7C, 0xAB, 0x30, 0x0A, 0xC9, 0x57, 0x72,
+ 0x78, 0xE1, 0xDD, 0xD5, 0xAE, 0xF7, 0x66, 0x97
+ };
+
+ u_char outer_mppe_recv_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_SIZE] = {
+ 0x17, 0x52, 0xD4, 0xE5, 0x84, 0xA1, 0xC8, 0x95,
+ 0x03, 0x9B, 0x4D, 0x05, 0xE3, 0xBC, 0x9A, 0x84,
+ 0x84, 0xDD, 0xC2, 0xAA, 0x6E, 0x2C, 0xE1, 0x62,
+ 0x76, 0x5C, 0x40, 0x68, 0xBF, 0xF6, 0x5A, 0x45
+ };
+
+ u_char result[MPPE_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+ int len;
+
+ mppe_clear_keys();
+
+ generate_mppe_keys(ipmk, 1);
+
+ len = mppe_get_recv_key(result, sizeof(result));
+ if (len != sizeof(result)) {
+ dbglog("Invalid length of resulting MPPE recv key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(result, outer_mppe_recv_key, len) != 0) {
+ dbglog("Invalid result for outer mppe recv key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ len = mppe_get_send_key(result, sizeof(result));
+ if (len != sizeof(result)) {
+ dbglog("Invalid length of resulting MPPE send key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(result, outer_mppe_send_key, len) != 0) {
+ dbglog("Invalid result for outer mppe send key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ u_char ipmk[PEAP_TLV_IPMK_LEN] = {
+ 0x3A, 0x91, 0x1C, 0x25, 0x54, 0x73, 0xE8, 0x3E,
+ 0x9A, 0x0C, 0xC3, 0x33, 0xAE, 0x1F, 0x8A, 0x35,
+ 0xCD, 0xC7, 0x41, 0x63, 0xE7, 0xF6, 0x0F, 0x6C,
+ 0x65, 0xEF, 0x71, 0xC2, 0x64, 0x42, 0xAA, 0xAC,
+ 0xA2, 0xB6, 0xF1, 0xEB, 0x4F, 0x25, 0xEC, 0xA3,
+ };
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ ret = test_cmk(ipmk);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = test_mppe(ipmk);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
projects / ppp.git / blobdiff