Fix an fd leak on the discovery socket.

[ppp.git] / pppd / chap_ms.c

diff --git a/pppd/chap_ms.c b/pppd/chap_ms.c
index a489cc0d111aae8d61af1aed4432b06ddd5ce574..16fb3a881e91f7bcaa83f1b8f88a3fe4866d7125 100644 (file)
--- a/pppd/chap_ms.c
+++ b/pppd/chap_ms.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
  *
  */
 
-#define RCSID  "$Id: chap_ms.c,v 1.29 2003/06/11 23:56:26 paulus Exp $"
+#define RCSID  "$Id: chap_ms.c,v 1.31 2004/04/14 02:39:39 carlsonj Exp $"
 
 #ifdef CHAPMS
 
@@ -164,9 +164,11 @@ static void
 chapms_generate_challenge(unsigned char *challenge)
 {
        *challenge++ = 8;
+#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY
        if (mschap_challenge && strlen(mschap_challenge) == 8)
                memcpy(challenge, mschap_challenge, 8);
        else
+#endif
                random_bytes(challenge, 8);
 }
 
@@ -174,9 +176,11 @@ static void
 chapms2_generate_challenge(unsigned char *challenge)
 {
        *challenge++ = 16;
+#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY
        if (mschap_challenge && strlen(mschap_challenge) == 16)
                memcpy(challenge, mschap_challenge, 16);
        else
+#endif
                random_bytes(challenge, 16);
 }
 
@@ -186,17 +190,18 @@ chapms_verify_response(int id, char *name,
                       unsigned char *challenge, unsigned char *response,
                       char *message, int message_space)
 {
-       MS_ChapResponse *rmd = (MS_ChapResponse *) response;
+       MS_ChapResponse *rmd;
        MS_ChapResponse md;
        int diff;
        int challenge_len, response_len;
 
        challenge_len = *challenge++;   /* skip length, is 8 */
-
        response_len = *response++;
        if (response_len != MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN)
                goto bad;
 
+       rmd = (MS_ChapResponse *) response;
+
 #ifndef MSLANMAN
        if (!rmd->UseNT[0]) {
                /* Should really propagate this into the error packet. */
@@ -206,7 +211,7 @@ chapms_verify_response(int id, char *name,
 #endif
 
        /* Generate the expected response. */
-       ChapMS(challenge, secret, secret_len, &md);
+       ChapMS(challenge, (char *)secret, secret_len, &md);
 
 #ifdef MSLANMAN
        /* Determine which part of response to verify against */
@@ -235,7 +240,7 @@ chapms2_verify_response(int id, char *name,
                        unsigned char *challenge, unsigned char *response,
                        char *message, int message_space)
 {
-       MS_Chap2Response *rmd = (MS_Chap2Response *) response;
+       MS_Chap2Response *rmd;
        MS_Chap2Response md;
        char saresponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1];
        int challenge_len, response_len;
@@ -245,10 +250,12 @@ chapms2_verify_response(int id, char *name,
        if (response_len != MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN)
                goto bad;       /* not even the right length */
 
+       rmd = (MS_Chap2Response *) response;
+
        /* Generate the expected response and our mutual auth. */
        ChapMS2(challenge, rmd->PeerChallenge, name,
-               secret, secret_len, &md,
-               saresponse, MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATOR);
+               (char *)secret, secret_len, &md,
+               (unsigned char *)saresponse, MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATOR);
 
        /* compare MDs and send the appropriate status */
        /*
@@ -323,8 +330,13 @@ chapms2_make_response(unsigned char *response, int id, char *our_name,
 {
        challenge++;    /* skip length, should be 16 */
        *response++ = MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN;
-       ChapMS2(challenge, mschap2_peer_challenge, our_name,
-               secret, secret_len,
+       ChapMS2(challenge,
+#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY
+               mschap2_peer_challenge,
+#else
+               NULL,
+#endif
+               our_name, secret, secret_len,
                (MS_Chap2Response *) response, private,
                MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATEE);
 }
@@ -332,7 +344,8 @@ chapms2_make_response(unsigned char *response, int id, char *our_name,
 static int
 chapms2_check_success(unsigned char *msg, int len, unsigned char *private)
 {
-       if ((len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 2) || strncmp(msg, "S=", 2)) {
+       if ((len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 2) ||
+           strncmp((char *)msg, "S=", 2) != 0) {
                /* Packet does not start with "S=" */
                error("MS-CHAPv2 Success packet is badly formed.");
                return 0;
@@ -348,7 +361,7 @@ chapms2_check_success(unsigned char *msg, int len, unsigned char *private)
        /* Authenticator Response matches. */
        msg += MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; /* Eat it */
        len -= MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH;
-       if ((len >= 3) && !strncmp(msg, " M=", 3)) {
+       if ((len >= 3) && !strncmp((char *)msg, " M=", 3)) {
                msg += 3; /* Eat the delimiter */
        } else if (len) {
                /* Packet has extra text which does not begin " M=" */
@@ -474,7 +487,7 @@ ChallengeHash(u_char PeerChallenge[16], u_char *rchallenge,
     SHA1_Init(&sha1Context);
     SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PeerChallenge, 16);
     SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, rchallenge, 16);
-    SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, user, strlen(user));
+    SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, (unsigned char *)user, strlen(user));
     SHA1_Final(sha1Hash, &sha1Context);
 
     BCOPY(sha1Hash, Challenge, 8);
@@ -509,7 +522,7 @@ NTPasswordHash(char *secret, int secret_len, u_char hash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE])
     MD4_CTX            md4Context;
 
     MD4Init(&md4Context);
-    MD4Update(&md4Context, secret, mdlen);
+    MD4Update(&md4Context, (unsigned char *)secret, mdlen);
     MD4Final(hash, &md4Context);
 
 }
@@ -523,7 +536,7 @@ ChapMS_NT(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len,
 
     /* Hash the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */
     ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword);
-    NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash);
+    NTPasswordHash((char *)unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash);
 
     ChallengeResponse(rchallenge, PasswordHash, NTResponse);
 }
@@ -536,11 +549,12 @@ ChapMS2_NT(char *rchallenge, u_char PeerChallenge[16], char *username,
     u_char     PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE];
     u_char     Challenge[8];
 
-    ChallengeHash(PeerChallenge, rchallenge, username, Challenge);
+    ChallengeHash(PeerChallenge, (unsigned char *)rchallenge, username,
+                 Challenge);
 
     /* Hash the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */
     ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword);
-    NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash);
+    NTPasswordHash((char *)unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash);
 
     ChallengeResponse(Challenge, PasswordHash, NTResponse);
 }
@@ -600,8 +614,9 @@ GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(char *secret, int secret_len,
 
     /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */
     ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword);
-    NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash);
-    NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash);
+    NTPasswordHash((char *)unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash);
+    NTPasswordHash((char *)PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash),
+                  PasswordHashHash);
 
     SHA1_Init(&sha1Context);
     SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, sizeof(PasswordHashHash));
@@ -619,7 +634,7 @@ GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(char *secret, int secret_len,
 
     /* Convert to ASCII hex string. */
     for (i = 0; i < MAX((MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH / 2), sizeof(Digest)); i++)
-       sprintf(&authResponse[i * 2], "%02X", Digest[i]);
+       sprintf((char *)&authResponse[i * 2], "%02X", Digest[i]);
 }
 
 
@@ -822,7 +837,7 @@ ChapMS2(u_char *rchallenge, u_char *PeerChallenge,
              sizeof(response->PeerChallenge));
 
     /* Generate the NT-Response */
-    ChapMS2_NT(rchallenge, response->PeerChallenge, user,
+    ChapMS2_NT((char *)rchallenge, response->PeerChallenge, user,
               secret, secret_len, response->NTResp);
 
     /* Generate the Authenticator Response. */