X-Git-Url: http://git.ozlabs.org/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=pppd%2Fchap_ms.c;h=d315ab4acd0182258fb25bee21f472e2d021f42b;hb=d706c95906d996534f13632a747af5dc617f306e;hp=a489cc0d111aae8d61af1aed4432b06ddd5ce574;hpb=71d3de90eae52087b405e962ca650b71cec79c67;p=ppp.git diff --git a/pppd/chap_ms.c b/pppd/chap_ms.c index a489cc0..d315ab4 100644 --- a/pppd/chap_ms.c +++ b/pppd/chap_ms.c @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ * */ -#define RCSID "$Id: chap_ms.c,v 1.29 2003/06/11 23:56:26 paulus Exp $" +#define RCSID "$Id: chap_ms.c,v 1.38 2007/12/01 20:10:51 carlsonj Exp $" #ifdef CHAPMS @@ -93,27 +93,19 @@ #include "sha1.h" #include "pppcrypt.h" #include "magic.h" - -static const char rcsid[] = RCSID; - - -static void ChallengeHash __P((u_char[16], u_char *, char *, u_char[8])); -static void ascii2unicode __P((char[], int, u_char[])); -static void NTPasswordHash __P((char *, int, u_char[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE])); -static void ChallengeResponse __P((u_char *, u_char *, u_char[24])); -static void ChapMS_NT __P((u_char *, char *, int, u_char[24])); -static void ChapMS2_NT __P((char *, u_char[16], char *, char *, int, - u_char[24])); -static void GenerateAuthenticatorResponse __P((char*, int, u_char[24], - u_char[16], u_char *, - char *, u_char[41])); +#include "mppe.h" + +static void ascii2unicode (char[], int, u_char[]); +static void NTPasswordHash (u_char *, int, u_char[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]); +static void ChallengeResponse (u_char *, u_char *, u_char[24]); +static void ChapMS_NT (u_char *, char *, int, u_char[24]); +static void ChapMS2_NT (u_char *, u_char[16], char *, char *, int, + u_char[24]); +static void GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain + (char*, int, u_char[24], u_char[16], u_char *, + char *, u_char[41]); #ifdef MSLANMAN -static void ChapMS_LANMan __P((u_char *, char *, int, MS_ChapResponse *)); -#endif - -#ifdef MPPE -static void Set_Start_Key __P((u_char *, char *, int)); -static void SetMasterKeys __P((char *, int, u_char[24], int)); +static void ChapMS_LANMan (u_char *, char *, int, u_char *); #endif #ifdef MSLANMAN @@ -122,15 +114,13 @@ bool ms_lanman = 0; /* Use LanMan password instead of NT */ #endif #ifdef MPPE -u_char mppe_send_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN]; -u_char mppe_recv_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN]; -int mppe_keys_set = 0; /* Have the MPPE keys been set? */ - +#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY /* For MPPE debug */ /* Use "[]|}{?/><,`!2&&(" (sans quotes) for RFC 3079 MS-CHAPv2 test value */ static char *mschap_challenge = NULL; /* Use "!@\#$%^&*()_+:3|~" (sans quotes, backslash is to escape #) for ... */ static char *mschap2_peer_challenge = NULL; +#endif #include "fsm.h" /* Need to poke MPPE options */ #include "ccp.h" @@ -164,9 +154,11 @@ static void chapms_generate_challenge(unsigned char *challenge) { *challenge++ = 8; +#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY if (mschap_challenge && strlen(mschap_challenge) == 8) memcpy(challenge, mschap_challenge, 8); else +#endif random_bytes(challenge, 8); } @@ -174,9 +166,11 @@ static void chapms2_generate_challenge(unsigned char *challenge) { *challenge++ = 16; +#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY if (mschap_challenge && strlen(mschap_challenge) == 16) memcpy(challenge, mschap_challenge, 16); else +#endif random_bytes(challenge, 16); } @@ -186,19 +180,17 @@ chapms_verify_response(int id, char *name, unsigned char *challenge, unsigned char *response, char *message, int message_space) { - MS_ChapResponse *rmd = (MS_ChapResponse *) response; - MS_ChapResponse md; + unsigned char md[MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN]; int diff; int challenge_len, response_len; challenge_len = *challenge++; /* skip length, is 8 */ - response_len = *response++; if (response_len != MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN) goto bad; #ifndef MSLANMAN - if (!rmd->UseNT[0]) { + if (!response[MS_CHAP_USENT]) { /* Should really propagate this into the error packet. */ notice("Peer request for LANMAN auth not supported"); goto bad; @@ -206,16 +198,17 @@ chapms_verify_response(int id, char *name, #endif /* Generate the expected response. */ - ChapMS(challenge, secret, secret_len, &md); + ChapMS(challenge, (char *)secret, secret_len, md); #ifdef MSLANMAN /* Determine which part of response to verify against */ - if (!rmd->UseNT[0]) - diff = memcmp(&rmd->LANManResp, &md.LANManResp, - sizeof(md.LANManResp)); + if (!response[MS_CHAP_USENT]) + diff = memcmp(&response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP], + &md[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP], MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP_LEN); else #endif - diff = memcmp(&rmd->NTResp, &md.NTResp, sizeof(md.NTResp)); + diff = memcmp(&response[MS_CHAP_NTRESP], &md[MS_CHAP_NTRESP], + MS_CHAP_NTRESP_LEN); if (diff == 0) { slprintf(message, message_space, "Access granted"); @@ -235,8 +228,7 @@ chapms2_verify_response(int id, char *name, unsigned char *challenge, unsigned char *response, char *message, int message_space) { - MS_Chap2Response *rmd = (MS_Chap2Response *) response; - MS_Chap2Response md; + unsigned char md[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN]; char saresponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]; int challenge_len, response_len; @@ -246,9 +238,9 @@ chapms2_verify_response(int id, char *name, goto bad; /* not even the right length */ /* Generate the expected response and our mutual auth. */ - ChapMS2(challenge, rmd->PeerChallenge, name, - secret, secret_len, &md, - saresponse, MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATOR); + ChapMS2(challenge, &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], name, + (char *)secret, secret_len, md, + (unsigned char *)saresponse, MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATOR); /* compare MDs and send the appropriate status */ /* @@ -270,8 +262,9 @@ chapms2_verify_response(int id, char *name, * Special thanks to Alex Swiridov for * help debugging this. */ - if (memcmp(md.NTResp, rmd->NTResp, sizeof(md.NTResp)) == 0) { - if (rmd->Flags[0]) + if (memcmp(&md[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], + MS_CHAP2_NTRESP_LEN) == 0) { + if (response[MS_CHAP2_FLAGS]) slprintf(message, message_space, "S=%s", saresponse); else slprintf(message, message_space, "S=%s M=%s", @@ -313,7 +306,63 @@ chapms_make_response(unsigned char *response, int id, char *our_name, { challenge++; /* skip length, should be 8 */ *response++ = MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN; - ChapMS(challenge, secret, secret_len, (MS_ChapResponse *) response); + ChapMS(challenge, secret, secret_len, response); +} + +struct chapms2_response_cache_entry { + int id; + unsigned char challenge[16]; + unsigned char response[MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN]; + unsigned char auth_response[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH]; +}; + +#define CHAPMS2_MAX_RESPONSE_CACHE_SIZE 10 +static struct chapms2_response_cache_entry + chapms2_response_cache[CHAPMS2_MAX_RESPONSE_CACHE_SIZE]; +static int chapms2_response_cache_next_index = 0; +static int chapms2_response_cache_size = 0; + +static void +chapms2_add_to_response_cache(int id, unsigned char *challenge, + unsigned char *response, + unsigned char *auth_response) +{ + int i = chapms2_response_cache_next_index; + + chapms2_response_cache[i].id = id; + memcpy(chapms2_response_cache[i].challenge, challenge, 16); + memcpy(chapms2_response_cache[i].response, response, + MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN); + memcpy(chapms2_response_cache[i].auth_response, + auth_response, MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH); + chapms2_response_cache_next_index = + (i + 1) % CHAPMS2_MAX_RESPONSE_CACHE_SIZE; + if (chapms2_response_cache_next_index > chapms2_response_cache_size) + chapms2_response_cache_size = chapms2_response_cache_next_index; + dbglog("added response cache entry %d", i); +} + +static struct chapms2_response_cache_entry* +chapms2_find_in_response_cache(int id, unsigned char *challenge, + unsigned char *auth_response) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < chapms2_response_cache_size; i++) { + if (id == chapms2_response_cache[i].id + && (!challenge + || memcmp(challenge, + chapms2_response_cache[i].challenge, + 16) == 0) + && (!auth_response + || memcmp(auth_response, + chapms2_response_cache[i].auth_response, + MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH) == 0)) { + dbglog("response found in cache (entry %d)", i); + return &chapms2_response_cache[i]; + } + } + return NULL; /* not found */ } static void @@ -321,18 +370,32 @@ chapms2_make_response(unsigned char *response, int id, char *our_name, unsigned char *challenge, char *secret, int secret_len, unsigned char *private) { + const struct chapms2_response_cache_entry *cache_entry; + unsigned char auth_response[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]; + challenge++; /* skip length, should be 16 */ *response++ = MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN; - ChapMS2(challenge, mschap2_peer_challenge, our_name, - secret, secret_len, - (MS_Chap2Response *) response, private, + cache_entry = chapms2_find_in_response_cache(id, challenge, NULL); + if (cache_entry) { + memcpy(response, cache_entry->response, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN); + return; + } + ChapMS2(challenge, +#ifdef DEBUGMPPEKEY + mschap2_peer_challenge, +#else + NULL, +#endif + our_name, secret, secret_len, response, auth_response, MS_CHAP2_AUTHENTICATEE); + chapms2_add_to_response_cache(id, challenge, response, auth_response); } static int -chapms2_check_success(unsigned char *msg, int len, unsigned char *private) +chapms2_check_success(int id, unsigned char *msg, int len) { - if ((len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 2) || strncmp(msg, "S=", 2)) { + if ((len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH + 2) || + strncmp((char *)msg, "S=", 2) != 0) { /* Packet does not start with "S=" */ error("MS-CHAPv2 Success packet is badly formed."); return 0; @@ -340,7 +403,7 @@ chapms2_check_success(unsigned char *msg, int len, unsigned char *private) msg += 2; len -= 2; if (len < MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH - || memcmp(msg, private, MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH)) { + || !chapms2_find_in_response_cache(id, NULL /* challenge */, msg)) { /* Authenticator Response did not match expected. */ error("MS-CHAPv2 mutual authentication failed."); return 0; @@ -348,8 +411,10 @@ chapms2_check_success(unsigned char *msg, int len, unsigned char *private) /* Authenticator Response matches. */ msg += MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; /* Eat it */ len -= MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH; - if ((len >= 3) && !strncmp(msg, " M=", 3)) { + if ((len >= 3) && !strncmp((char *)msg, " M=", 3)) { msg += 3; /* Eat the delimiter */ + } else if ((len >= 2) && !strncmp((char *)msg, "M=", 2)) { + msg += 2; /* Eat the delimiter */ } else if (len) { /* Packet has extra text which does not begin " M=" */ error("MS-CHAPv2 Success packet is badly formed."); @@ -381,7 +446,7 @@ chapms_handle_failure(unsigned char *inp, int len) * chapms[2]_verify_response. */ if (!strncmp(p, "E=", 2)) - err = strtol(p, NULL, 10); /* Remember the error code. */ + err = strtol(p+2, NULL, 10); /* Remember the error code. */ else goto print_msg; /* Message is badly formatted. */ @@ -456,7 +521,7 @@ ChallengeResponse(u_char *challenge, #endif } -static void +void ChallengeHash(u_char PeerChallenge[16], u_char *rchallenge, char *username, u_char Challenge[8]) @@ -474,7 +539,7 @@ ChallengeHash(u_char PeerChallenge[16], u_char *rchallenge, SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PeerChallenge, 16); SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, rchallenge, 16); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, user, strlen(user)); + SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, (unsigned char *)user, strlen(user)); SHA1_Final(sha1Hash, &sha1Context); BCOPY(sha1Hash, Challenge, 8); @@ -498,7 +563,7 @@ ascii2unicode(char ascii[], int ascii_len, u_char unicode[]) } static void -NTPasswordHash(char *secret, int secret_len, u_char hash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]) +NTPasswordHash(u_char *secret, int secret_len, u_char hash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]) { #ifdef __NetBSD__ /* NetBSD uses the libc md4 routines which take bytes instead of bits */ @@ -509,6 +574,12 @@ NTPasswordHash(char *secret, int secret_len, u_char hash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]) MD4_CTX md4Context; MD4Init(&md4Context); + /* MD4Update can take at most 64 bytes at a time */ + while (mdlen > 512) { + MD4Update(&md4Context, secret, 512); + secret += 64; + mdlen -= 512; + } MD4Update(&md4Context, secret, mdlen); MD4Final(hash, &md4Context); @@ -529,7 +600,7 @@ ChapMS_NT(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, } static void -ChapMS2_NT(char *rchallenge, u_char PeerChallenge[16], char *username, +ChapMS2_NT(u_char *rchallenge, u_char PeerChallenge[16], char *username, char *secret, int secret_len, u_char NTResponse[24]) { u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; @@ -550,7 +621,7 @@ static u_char *StdText = (u_char *)"KGS!@#$%"; /* key from rasapi32.dll */ static void ChapMS_LANMan(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, - MS_ChapResponse *response) + unsigned char *response) { int i; u_char UcasePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD]; /* max is actually 14 */ @@ -564,13 +635,13 @@ ChapMS_LANMan(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, DesEncrypt( StdText, PasswordHash + 0 ); (void) DesSetkey(UcasePassword + 7); DesEncrypt( StdText, PasswordHash + 8 ); - ChallengeResponse(rchallenge, PasswordHash, response->LANManResp); + ChallengeResponse(rchallenge, PasswordHash, &response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP]); } #endif -static void -GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(char *secret, int secret_len, +void +GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE], u_char NTResponse[24], u_char PeerChallenge[16], u_char *rchallenge, char *username, u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]) @@ -592,19 +663,11 @@ GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(char *secret, int secret_len, int i; SHA1_CTX sha1Context; - u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; - u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; u_char Challenge[8]; - /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ - ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); - NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); - NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash); - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, sizeof(PasswordHashHash)); + SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, NTResponse, 24); SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Magic1, sizeof(Magic1)); SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); @@ -619,32 +682,34 @@ GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(char *secret, int secret_len, /* Convert to ASCII hex string. */ for (i = 0; i < MAX((MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH / 2), sizeof(Digest)); i++) - sprintf(&authResponse[i * 2], "%02X", Digest[i]); + sprintf((char *)&authResponse[i * 2], "%02X", Digest[i]); } -#ifdef MPPE -/* - * Set mppe_xxxx_key from the NTPasswordHashHash. - * RFC 2548 (RADIUS support) requires us to export this function (ugh). - */ -void -mppe_set_keys(u_char *rchallenge, u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]) +static void +GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain + (char *secret, int secret_len, + u_char NTResponse[24], u_char PeerChallenge[16], + u_char *rchallenge, char *username, + u_char authResponse[MS_AUTH_RESPONSE_LENGTH+1]) { - SHA1_CTX sha1Context; - u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ + u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; + u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; + u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, rchallenge, 8); - SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); + /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ + ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); + NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); + NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), + PasswordHashHash); - /* Same key in both directions. */ - BCOPY(Digest, mppe_send_key, sizeof(mppe_send_key)); - BCOPY(Digest, mppe_recv_key, sizeof(mppe_recv_key)); + GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(PasswordHashHash, NTResponse, PeerChallenge, + rchallenge, username, authResponse); } + +#ifdef MPPE + /* * Set mppe_xxxx_key from MS-CHAP credentials. (see RFC 3079) */ @@ -660,7 +725,7 @@ Set_Start_Key(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len) NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash); - mppe_set_keys(rchallenge, PasswordHashHash); + mppe_set_chapv1(rchallenge, PasswordHashHash); } /* @@ -669,97 +734,14 @@ Set_Start_Key(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len) static void SetMasterKeys(char *secret, int secret_len, u_char NTResponse[24], int IsServer) { - SHA1_CTX sha1Context; u_char unicodePassword[MAX_NT_PASSWORD * 2]; u_char PasswordHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; u_char PasswordHashHash[MD4_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; - u_char MasterKey[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ - u_char Digest[SHA1_SIGNATURE_SIZE]; /* >= MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN */ - - u_char SHApad1[40] = - { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, - 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; - u_char SHApad2[40] = - { 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, - 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, - 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, - 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2 }; - - /* "This is the MPPE Master Key" */ - u_char Magic1[27] = - { 0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, - 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x4d, 0x50, 0x50, 0x45, 0x20, 0x4d, - 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79 }; - /* "On the client side, this is the send key; " - "on the server side, it is the receive key." */ - u_char Magic2[84] = - { 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, - 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, - 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, - 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, - 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, - 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20, - 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e }; - /* "On the client side, this is the receive key; " - "on the server side, it is the send key." */ - u_char Magic3[84] = - { 0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, - 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, - 0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20, - 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, - 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, - 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, - 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, - 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e }; - u_char *s; - /* Hash (x2) the Unicode version of the secret (== password). */ ascii2unicode(secret, secret_len, unicodePassword); NTPasswordHash(unicodePassword, secret_len * 2, PasswordHash); NTPasswordHash(PasswordHash, sizeof(PasswordHash), PasswordHashHash); - - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, PasswordHashHash, sizeof(PasswordHashHash)); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, NTResponse, 24); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, Magic1, sizeof(Magic1)); - SHA1_Final(MasterKey, &sha1Context); - - /* - * generate send key - */ - if (IsServer) - s = Magic3; - else - s = Magic2; - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, MasterKey, 16); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad1, sizeof(SHApad1)); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, s, 84); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad2, sizeof(SHApad2)); - SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); - - BCOPY(Digest, mppe_send_key, sizeof(mppe_send_key)); - - /* - * generate recv key - */ - if (IsServer) - s = Magic2; - else - s = Magic3; - SHA1_Init(&sha1Context); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, MasterKey, 16); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad1, sizeof(SHApad1)); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, s, 84); - SHA1_Update(&sha1Context, SHApad2, sizeof(SHApad2)); - SHA1_Final(Digest, &sha1Context); - - BCOPY(Digest, mppe_recv_key, sizeof(mppe_recv_key)); + mppe_set_chapv2(PasswordHashHash, NTResponse, IsServer); } #endif /* MPPE */ @@ -767,107 +749,73 @@ SetMasterKeys(char *secret, int secret_len, u_char NTResponse[24], int IsServer) void ChapMS(u_char *rchallenge, char *secret, int secret_len, - MS_ChapResponse *response) + unsigned char *response) { -#if 0 - CHAPDEBUG((LOG_INFO, "ChapMS: secret is '%.*s'", secret_len, secret)); -#endif - BZERO(response, sizeof(*response)); + BZERO(response, MS_CHAP_RESPONSE_LEN); - ChapMS_NT(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, response->NTResp); + ChapMS_NT(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, &response[MS_CHAP_NTRESP]); #ifdef MSLANMAN - ChapMS_LANMan(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, response); + ChapMS_LANMan(rchallenge, secret, secret_len, + &response[MS_CHAP_LANMANRESP]); /* preferred method is set by option */ - response->UseNT[0] = !ms_lanman; + response[MS_CHAP_USENT] = !ms_lanman; #else - response->UseNT[0] = 1; + response[MS_CHAP_USENT] = 1; #endif #ifdef MPPE Set_Start_Key(rchallenge, secret, secret_len); - mppe_keys_set = 1; #endif } /* - * If PeerChallenge is NULL, one is generated and response->PeerChallenge - * is filled in. Call this way when generating a response. - * If PeerChallenge is supplied, it is copied into response->PeerChallenge. + * If PeerChallenge is NULL, one is generated and the PeerChallenge + * field of response is filled in. Call this way when generating a response. + * If PeerChallenge is supplied, it is copied into the PeerChallenge field. * Call this way when verifying a response (or debugging). - * Do not call with PeerChallenge = response->PeerChallenge. + * Do not call with PeerChallenge = response. * - * response->PeerChallenge is then used for calculation of the + * The PeerChallenge field of response is then used for calculation of the * Authenticator Response. */ void ChapMS2(u_char *rchallenge, u_char *PeerChallenge, - char *user, char *secret, int secret_len, MS_Chap2Response *response, + char *user, char *secret, int secret_len, unsigned char *response, u_char authResponse[], int authenticator) { /* ARGSUSED */ - u_char *p = response->PeerChallenge; + u_char *p = &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE]; int i; - BZERO(response, sizeof(*response)); + BZERO(response, MS_CHAP2_RESPONSE_LEN); /* Generate the Peer-Challenge if requested, or copy it if supplied. */ if (!PeerChallenge) - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(response->PeerChallenge); i++) + for (i = 0; i < MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN; i++) *p++ = (u_char) (drand48() * 0xff); else - BCOPY(PeerChallenge, response->PeerChallenge, - sizeof(response->PeerChallenge)); + BCOPY(PeerChallenge, &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], + MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHAL_LEN); /* Generate the NT-Response */ - ChapMS2_NT(rchallenge, response->PeerChallenge, user, - secret, secret_len, response->NTResp); + ChapMS2_NT(rchallenge, &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], user, + secret, secret_len, &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP]); /* Generate the Authenticator Response. */ - GenerateAuthenticatorResponse(secret, secret_len, response->NTResp, - response->PeerChallenge, rchallenge, - user, authResponse); + GenerateAuthenticatorResponsePlain(secret, secret_len, + &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], + &response[MS_CHAP2_PEER_CHALLENGE], + rchallenge, user, authResponse); #ifdef MPPE - SetMasterKeys(secret, secret_len, response->NTResp, authenticator); - mppe_keys_set = 1; + SetMasterKeys(secret, secret_len, + &response[MS_CHAP2_NTRESP], authenticator); #endif } -#ifdef MPPE -/* - * Set MPPE options from plugins. - */ -void -set_mppe_enc_types(int policy, int types) -{ - /* Early exit for unknown policies. */ - if (policy != MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_ALLOWED || - policy != MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_REQUIRED) - return; - - /* Don't modify MPPE if it's optional and wasn't already configured. */ - if (policy == MPPE_ENC_POL_ENC_ALLOWED && !ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe) - return; - - /* - * Disable undesirable encryption types. Note that we don't ENABLE - * any encryption types, to avoid overriding manual configuration. - */ - switch(types) { - case MPPE_ENC_TYPES_RC4_40: - ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_128; /* disable 128-bit */ - break; - case MPPE_ENC_TYPES_RC4_128: - ccp_wantoptions[0].mppe &= ~MPPE_OPT_40; /* disable 40-bit */ - break; - default: - break; - } -} -#endif /* MPPE */ static struct chap_digest_type chapms_digest = { CHAP_MICROSOFT, /* code */